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I. Introduction
Coercion and cooperation are opposing facets of human social
interaction.' In fact, "every human relationship is some mixture of
coercion and cooperation."2  On any given issue, many factors cause
people to agree and disagree. When people agree, they are able to
cooperate for the benefit of all involved parties. When individuals do not
agree, negotiations occur. If these negotiations fail, coercive measures
may be attempted. The decision whether to use coercive measures
involves the balancing of the probable costs against the benefit, or likely
success, of the coercive measures. On the international level, relations
between States are similar to those between people on a social level.
When State interests do not coincide, and negotiations fail, States will
perform a cost-benefits analysis and may decide to use coercive
measures to achieve their objectives.
"Justin D. Stalls is a 3d year student at the University of Miami School of Law.
He completed his undergraduate degree at Trinity University in San Antonio,
Texas.
1 Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International
Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (1985) (stating that "[c]oercion is normal in all
human relationships... [i]t's part of life").
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Historically, the basic tool for international coercion has been
warfare. However, the sheer horror of violence, the memory of both
World Wars, and the fear of atomic annihilation have led many States to
limit violent conflict in the latter half of the twentieth century. To this
end, many modem international organizations have been founded,
including the United Nations. Such organizations provide a forum for
diplomacy, communication, and negotiation. However, when diplomacy
fails, the basic necessity for coercion between States still exists. 3 In
order to meet said necessity, many nations have expanded their use of
non-violent forms of coercion.
Economic sanctions are generally considered a nonviolent form
of coercion because they do not involve military warfare. Nonetheless,
the traditional use of economic sanctions has led to or accompanied
warfare.4 For example, the British colonies in the United States of
America instituted economic sanctions against England when they
boycotted English goods from 1767 to 1770.5 In effect, the colonies
closed their market to England in response to the Townshend Acts which
taxed the colonists. Eventually, England repealed the act but retained the
tax on tea. This tea tax was the pretext for the Boston Tea Party of 1774
and was a precursor to the American War for Independence. This
traditional association between a military undertaking and economic
sanctions continued throughout the first half of the 2 0th century.
6
However, the search for non-violent forms of coercion motivated policy
makers to disassociate economic sanctions from military action.
3 See Farer, supra note 1, at 413 ("For the sake of survival, we have tried to
harness force. But unless and until we build a real international community,
other forms of coercion will remain as instruments for the games nations play.").
4 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 4 (1985) ("Most of these
episodes [pre-World War I instances of economic sanctions] foreshadowed or
accompanied warfare").
5 See GEORGE E. SHAMBAUGH, STATES, FIRMS, AND POWER: SUCCESSFUL
SANCTIONS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 43 (James N. Rosenaw ed.,
1999) ("The U.S. government first imposed restrictions on the trade of American
goods in 1774 when the Continental Congress outlawed British imports and then
again, one year later, when it outlawed exports to Great Britain").
6 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 4-5.
7 See JOHN C. SCHARFEN, THE DISMAL BATTLEFIELD MOBILIZING FOR
ECONOMIC CONFLICT 180 (1995) ("The erosion of confidence in the utility of
military force has promoted the use of economic force."). Cf HUFBAUER &
SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 4 ("Only after World War I was extensive attention
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Currently, economic sanctions are considered a non-violent form of
coercion that may take the place of warfare.
The modem understanding of economic sanctions as a
nonviolent form of coercion coupled with the desire of policy makers to
avoid violent conflict has lead to a dramatic increase in the use of
economic sanctions during the latter half of the twentieth century. We
can look to the behavior of the United States as an example of this
international trend. After World War I, the United States expanded its
use of economic sanctions! During the Cold War, the potentially high
costs of warfare between the former United Soviet Socialist Republic
(U.S.S.R.) and the United States motivated the United States to use
economic sanctions rather than military might to manage the conflict!
The United States has continued to expand its use of economic sanctions
up to the present day. In particular, the 1990s saw a massive expansion
in the use of economic sanctions.'0 The current Vice President of the
United States, Dick Cheney, stated in 2001 that the United States has,
"some 70 countries around the world affected by sanctions of one kind or
another imposed by the United States. Those 70 countries are home to
almost two-thirds of the world's population."" It is apparent that the
given to the notion that economic sanctions might substitute for armed
hostilities.").
s See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 4, at 7.
9 See, e.g., Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and
Foreign Policy, in DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION 2 (Miroslav Nincic &
Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983) ("As the Cold War locked its protagonists into two
rival military blocks, and as the potential costs of their confrontation grew,
economic coercion became a less perilous manner of fighting the East-West
conflict.").
10 See, e.g., ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH
SANCTIONS ix (1999) ("The United States has been the preeminent trading
nation during the 1990s to use unilateral economic sanctions as a foreign policy
instrument"). See also Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The
Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U.L.
REv. 907, 907-908 (1997) ("In the last ten years, the United States has
increasingly focused on the use of economic sanctions, embargoes, and threats
of private legal action in its courts, as opposed to threats of nuclear weapons or
promises of billions of dollars of economic aid, to achieve long term foreign
policy objectives.").
Richard B. Cheney, Defending Liberty in a Global Economy, in ECONOMIC
CASUALTIES: HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND
Fall 2003
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United States is the current world leader in the use of economic
sanctions.' 2  As the current world leader in the use of economic
sanctions, the actions of the United States exemplify the expansive
modem use of these sanctions as a nonviolent form of coercion
motivated by a desire to avoid military conflict.
It should be noted that economic sanctions have a powerful
impact, even though their use is not violent in a military sense. A. Amir
AI-Anbari, the former ambassador of Iraq to the UK, the US, the UN and
UNESCO, states that, "[i]n reality, economic sanctions are by no means
peaceful and quite often are deadlier and more destructive than military
action."' 3 Economic sanctions are not as harmless as they appear at first
glance; they may involve the deprivation or infringement of human
rights. 14 AI-Anbari goes further to state, "[h]orrible as it is, the use of
LIBERTY (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold eds. 2001) at 23 (citing U.S.
News as his source). Cf Clayton Yeutter, Unilateral Sanctions: A Politically
Attractive Loser, in ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: How U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T.
Griswold eds. 2001) at 85 ("The President's Export Council calculated that, in
1997, more than half of the world's people were threatened by U.S. sanctions.").
12 See, e.g., Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) ("The
United States leads the world in resorting to economic sanctions for foreign
policy purposes"). See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Unilateral Versus Collective
Sanctions: An American Perception, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001) ("There is no doubt
that the United States has been the strongest proponent of economic sanctions
since World War II - in connection with the Cold War in its various shapes: in
response to terrorism as directed from Libya, Iran, Syria, perhaps Afghanistan,
and other countries; in response to suppression of democracy, as in Haiti and
Yugoslavia; and in response to forbidden arms build-up as in Iraq."); William H.
Lash III, An Overview of the Economic Costs of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, in
ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE,
GROWTH, AND LIBERTY (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold eds. 2001) at
13 ("Over 75 individual states, literally ranging from Angola to Zaire, are
currently subject to or potentially targeted by U.S. unilateral economic foreign
policy sanctions.").
13 A. Amir AI-Anbari, The Impact of United Nations Sanctions on Economic
Development, Human Rights and Civil Society, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 371 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001).
14 See Leonard B. Boudin, Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights, 19 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L. L. & POL. 803 (1987) ("Trade boycotts and other economic sanctions
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force... is in my view less destructive than economic sanctions4 5 If
AI-Anbari is correct, it appears that the international community has
been rash in its increased use of economic sanctions. Perhaps policy
makers have not been cognizant of the destructive power of
implementing economic sanctions or conversely, they have found that
there is simply no better option at the present time. In either case, there
is no doubt that economic sanctions are violent in their own way.
6
II. Modern Economic Sanctions: A Definition
Modem economic sanctions may be defined as coercive
economic measures taken by the sending State against the target State(s)
to coerce a change in the policies and practices of the target State(s). 7
The sending State's government may achieve its goals through
may seriously abridge the human rights of all persons as well as the
constitutional rights of citizens of the Unites States.").
15 AI-Anbari, supra note 13, at 380.
16 See generally John Mueller & Karl Mueller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 1999, at 43.
17 Compare Carter, supra note 12, at 1166 (defining economic sanctions as,
"coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries to attempt to
force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate the sanctioning country's
opinion of another's policies"), with HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 2
(defining economic sanctions as, "the deliberate government-inspired
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of "customary" trade or financial relations),
with PREEG, supra note 10, at 4 (defining economic sanctions, "as a restriction
on normal commercial relations with the targeted country"), with Kenneth W.
Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of Economic
Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
781, 783, 789 (1987) (defining economic sanctions as a means of
communication), with Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 9, at 3 (stating,
"[e]conomic coercion will be defined as the imposition of economic pain by one
government on another in order to attain some political goal"), with John
Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in DILEMMAS OF
ECONOMIC COERCION 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983)
(stating, "[w]e shall define sanctions as actions initiated by one or more
international actors (the "senders") against one or more others (the "receivers")
with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of
some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders
deem important"). Cf D. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 13-14 (1985)
("Economic Statecraft [a term that includes economic sanctions] refers to
influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable
semblance of a market price in terms of money").
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manipulation of taxation, imports, exports, foreign aid, access to markets,
or access to financial institutions.'8  Therefore, many government
programs may fall under the broad category of economic sanctions. It is
often difficult to differentiate between the normal economic controls that
a State exercises over its economy and economic sanctions designed to
coerce a foreign State.' 9 This difference may be found in the objective of
the sending State. If the objective is furtherance of the sending State's
economy, the coercive measures are not economic sanctions. In contrast,
when the objective of the sending State is not to achieve an economic
advantage for itself, the sending State is likely using economic sanctions.
Modem economic sanctions are no longer restricted to military
objectives. States have endeavored to "protect human rights, to halt
nuclear proliferation, to settle expropriation claims, and to combat
international terrorism'! 0 through the use of economic sanctions.
National security interests continue to motivate policy makers to
implement economic sanctions. 21 Taken as a whole, these expanded
objectives show that sending States have begun to use economic
sanctions to enforce legal norms.22 In sum, modern economic sanctions
attempt to enforce modem legal norms through economic, rather than
military means.
18 See Carter, supra note 12, at 1164.
19 Cf Andrd Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18
Revue beige de droit international 58, 68 (1984-85) (stating, "a State can always
consider the economic measures taken by another State as "coercive," just
because of the fact that it was obliged to take them into account while
determining its own economic policy").20 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT supra note 4, at 6.
21 See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHOTT supra note 4, at 5 (discussing multiple
sanction by the U.S. directed at the former Soviet Union and China).
22 See Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Vera Gowlland-
Debbas ed. 2001) ("The over-all purpose of sanction... is to ensure the normative
integrity of the legal system, that is the translation of the normative prescriptions
of its rules into social conduct."). See also Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does
the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate
Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.193,196(Fall 1994)
(stating that sanctions are, "non-military measures used to influence the leaders
of a nation for directing that nation in a certain way contrary to international
human rights law.").
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III. Legality of Economic Sanctions
It is well settled that customary international law does not
prohibit economic sanctions.23 The historical practice of States does not
recognize any prohibition against the use of economic sanctions.?
4
However, many poorer States argue that economic sanctions transgress
international law. These economically weaker nations need protection
from the economically coercive powers of the richer nations. They argue
that the U.N. Charter and other General Assembly resolutions constitute
sufficient State practice and opinio juris to create a new rule of
customary international law prohibiting the use of economic sanctions.
25
There may be a new rule of customary practice emerging 6 but this
27process has not been completed. Current State practice does not
recognize a prohibition against the use of economic sanctions under
customary international law. In fact, the expansive use of economic
sanctions in current State practice strongly evidences a belief that
economic sanctions are legal under customary international law.
In an attempt to regain control of its internal policies, an
economically weaker State may attempt to use a bilateral or multilateral
treaty for protection from economic sanctions. These treaties may
"expressly prohibit recourse to economic sanctions" '28 or "they may
restrict the use of economic sanctions as countermeasures [retortion or
23 Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-
Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old
Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 918 (1995)
("[H]istorically, there has been no norm prohibiting the use of economic
coercion.").
24 Cf BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 337 ("Traditional international law has treated
the regulation of foreign trade as one of the 'sovereign prerogatives of an
independent country;' therefore, in the absence of treaty obligations, states have
been free to use trade to pursue a wide variety of foreign policy goals").
25 Porotsky, supra note 23, at 919.
26 Cf. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 Virginia
Journal of International Law 449, 450 (2000) ("[Tjhere is neither a common
understanding of how customary international legal norms are formed, nor
afreement on the content of those norms").
Cf Porotsky, supra note 23, at 957 ("[T]he recent U.N. votes concerning the
embargo [against Cuba] provide no evidence that the post-Cold War
international community has moved toward a consensus on a norm prohibiting
the unilateral use of economic coercion").
28 Hans Van Houtte, Treaty Protections Against Economic Sanctions, 18 Revue
beige de droit international 34 (1984-85).
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reprisals]."29  These treaties are generally enforceable under the
cornerstone of international law: pacta sunt servanda. 30 However, the
current economic inequality between States makes it difficult for
economically poorer States to execute such a treaty.' Even if such a
treaty is signed, "[tireaty clauses forbidding economic measures...
cannot offer absolute protection against economic sanctions. Their
impact is often limited by other provisions of the treaty itself, by the law
of treaties, or by international law in general. 32 Therefore, even when a
bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaty exists, resorting to economic sanctions
may still be legal under international law.
IV. Justifying Circumstances for Economic Sanctions
State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise
of its sovereignty. This domestic economic control may have worldwide
impacts in the modern international economy. These impacts may force
other States to modify their own domestic economies. Therefore, the
domestic actions of one State may infringe upon the sovereignty of other
States. Nonetheless, "[c]onsidering economic measures as illegal only
because of their inflicting damage upon another State can hardly be
accepted since all economics are competitive. 33 Determining the intent
of the sending State is essential to differentiating between sovereign
control of one's domestic economy and economic sanctions. If the
sending State is merely acting to benefit its own economy its actions are
not economic sanctions. The enactment of economic sanctions by a
29 Id. at 36.
30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th ed. 1999) ("[Latin "agreements must be
kept"] The rule that agreements and stipulations, esp. those contained in treaties,
must be observed."). See SCHARFEN, supra note 7, at 83 ("[I]t is expected that
'civilized' nations will contribute to legitimate international cooperative efforts
and, once agreeing to the provisions of a charter or treaty, abide by their
commitment.").
31 See Porotsky, supra note 23, at 956 ("[Als long as inequality in terms of
economic power persists, the economically powerful have little incentive to sign
a treaty or engage in state practice that explicitly recognizes such a norm
[prohibiting the unilateral use of economic coercion.").
32Id at 42.
33 Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 68-69.
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sending State is designed to infringe upon the sovereignty of the target
State34 and not necessarily benefit the sending State's economic position.
Since the mid-17 'h century, the principle of absolute State
sovereignty has been recognized.35 Sovereignty is "supreme dominion,
authority, or rule 36 and is exercised by every independent (sovereign)
State.37 "Contained within the concept of sovereignty is the notion that a
nation may govern itself through institutions and rules created to effect
its goals and promote its values. In short, sovereignty is an expression of
self-determination." 38  However, under modem international law, the
absolute right to State sovereignty has been modified into a limited right.
This change was caused by the growing interdependence of States,
expansion of international business, technological improvements, the
growth of customary international law, i.e., the application of jus
cogens,39 and the rise of intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. Limited State sovereignty allows for intrusion into a
State's internal affairs if the intrusion is justified under international law.
When economic sanctions are used, the sending State must justify its
action because economic sanctions are coercive measures designed, "to
34 Cf Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 67 ("[S]everal GA Resolutions consider
economic coercion as an intervention in domestic affairs"). See generally U.N.
CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, and U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 and 7.
35 See Daniel C. Thomas, International NGOs, State Sovereignty, and
Democratic Values, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 389, 392 (2001) ("Since the Treaties of
Westphalia in 1648, the doctrine of unconditional State sovereignty has been a
central pillar of international law--States were not to interfere with each other's
handling of matters within their jurisdiction, including their treatment of
individuals within their borders.").
36 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (7th ed. 1999). Compare SHAMBAUGH,
supra note 5, at 25 ("Sovereignty is a legal, political, and social concept that
identifies the state as an autonomous entity responsible to no outside
authority.").
37 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (7th ed. 1999) ("A political community
whose members are bound together by the tie of common subjection to some
central authority, whose commands those members must obey").
38 Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive Business Practices in Global Markets:
Reflections on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and Comity, 33 STAN. L.
INT'L. L. 215, 218 (1997).
39 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999) ("[Latin "compelling law"] A
mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more nations
may exempt themselves or release one another.").
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'interfere in the internal affairs' of the target government." 40 Therefore, a
sending State will not enact economic sanctions unless it believes that its
action is justified.
A violation of international law may be a justification for the
enactment of economic sanctions. States, both individually and in
concert, use economic sanctions as a form of reprisal in response to
violations of international law.41 When a State violates international law,
other States may act like an international police force and attempt to
enforce the law. This is a necessary action because there is no formal
international law enforcement mechanism. In such a situation, reprisals
42
are commonly used by sending States in an attempt to impose "respect
for the law" on the target States.43 Independently considered, reprisals
are illegal acts.44 However, they are justified by the previous illegal act
of the target State.45 Under modem international law, "it is generally
accepted that armed reprisals are prohibited. ' 6  Since economic
40 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 9.
41 Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997)
("States individually and in concert are using economic sanctions to achieve the
enforcement of rules and decisions in the political or public law spheres").
42 Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 58, 62 ("Reprisals are a form of coercive action, in
se contrary to international law, which are taken by a claimant State against a
target State accused of having committed an unlawful act, with the purpose of
imposing respect for the law on the target State" and "[i]t is generally accepted
that reprisals must conform to the following criteria: (i) The first condition - a
conditio sine qua non - is that reprisals be a response to an act which is contrary
to the law of nations; this unlawful act and the subsequent refusal by the
offending State to amend it, presents a justa causa for the claimant State; (ii)
Reprisals should only be taken after an unsuccessful request to redress; (iii) In
view of the previous exhaustion of peaceful remedies, reprisals should react to a
situation of necessity; (iv) Reprisals must not be disproportionate vis-A-vis the
unlawful acts against which they are directed; (v) Reprisals must not consist of
inhuman or cruel acts, nor acts prohibited byjus in bello; (vi) Reprisals must not
prejudice the rights of third States; (vii) Reprisals should come to an end as soon
as reparation of the unlawful act occurred. Practically, this means the restoration
of the State of affairs existing before reprisals were resorted to; final situation is
never to emerge on the basis of reprisals; (viii) Reprisals should only be taken
by competent State organs").
43 Id. at 58
44Id. at 58, 61, 62.
45 Id. at 58, 61, 62.
46 Id. at 60-2.
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sanctions are non-armed coercive measures, they are used as economic
reprisal.47 Such non-armed economic reprisals may take the forms of,
"seizure of property, raising of customs tariffs, blocking of funds or
goods, boycott, [and] embargo."'' 8 Therefore, when a sovereign State
violates international law, another sovereign State may attempt to instill
respect for the law through the enactment of economic sanctions as
reprisals.
If a State's violation of international law directly threatens the
security, political independence, territorial integrity, national or economic
interests of a second State, the second State may initiate measures of self
defense.49  An act of self-defense is justified by the necessity of self-
preservation. This necessity differentiates self-defense from reprisals,
which merely attempt to enforce international law50 It is unlikely that
self-defense would be claimed as the justification for economic sanctions
as independent measures. Legitimate self-defense is recognized as an
international exception to the prohibition of the use of force.'
Therefore, if a State is threatened, it is more likely to respond with
military action. Nonetheless, in theory, self-defense may be claimed as a
justification for economic sanctions.
A sending State may also claim that its program of economic
sanctions is a measure of retortion which is merely an "unfriendly,
uncourteous or unfair" act by the sending State in response to a previous
47 Id. at 70 ("The limits and conditions for the applicability of economic
reprisals are the following: (i) According to international law reprisals have to be
a reaction against an illegal action. There is no legal ground for ordering
reprisals if the original infringement by the other State does not exist... (ii)
Reprisals have to be the ultimum remedium; all other procedures have been tried
without results. This implies primo that before a unilateral reprisal can be
ordered, the procedures provided for in a bi-or multilateral treaty for the
settlement of disputes which should arise, have been exhausted. Secundo that if
sanctions are provided for in the framework of certain organizations, parties are
obliged to use those sanctions rather than unilateral reprisals; (iii) Reprisals have
to be proportionate vis-A-vis the unlawful act; (iv) Reprisals have no final
character; (v) The utmost limits of reprisals are the rules of the jus in bello; (vi)
Reprisals are not permitted against a State for actions undertaken by its national
subjects; however nationals of the delinquent State may be the object of
reprisals.").
48 d. at 61.
49 Id. at 59, 74.50 Id. at 59.
51 See, e.g., U.N CHARTER, art. 51, para. 1.
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"unfriendly, uncourteous or unfair" act by the target State.!2 These
measures are merely "an exercise of normal State competence.'63
Retortion is not an illegal act and does not require a legal justification.54
Each individual State makes its own internal determination of whether or
not to enact a measure of retortion. It is not necessary to justify an act of
retortion because it is an inherently licit act.
V. Unilateral Versus Multilateral Economic Sanctions
In a program of unilateral economic sanctions, the sending State
determines whether the economic sanctions are justified or not. This is a
highly "subjective" 55 process. When multilateral economic sanctions are
enacted, there is a process of diplomatic communication and compromise.
This process involves the "subjective" determination of whether there is a
justification for the enactment of economic sanctions that legitimizes the
decision. Multilateral economic sanctions are commonly coordinated by
intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.56 The
necessity to reach "prior international agreement" before enacting
multilateral economic sanctions restricts their implementation and
legitimates the sanctions.57 When a program of economic sanctions is
supported by a multiplicity of nations, the program is internationally
legitimate.
The illegitimacy of unilateral economic sanctions is demonstrated
by the international community's response to the United States' use of
unilateral economic sanctions. In the 1990s, the United States used
unilateral economic sanctions more often than multilateral sanctions.58
The expanded use of unilateral economic sanctions evidences the United
States' desire to unilaterally "assert its leadership in world affairs.'59 The
most common goals of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions in the 1990s
were U.S. morality (human rights/democratization)60 and national
52 Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 63.
53 1d at63.
54 Id at 63 ("The question whether a measure of retortion is or is not justified, is
not a legal question.").551 d at 63.56 See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
57 PREEG, supra note 10, at 1.
58 PREEG, supra note 10, at 1.
59 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 9.
6o PREEG, supra note 10, at 201-203.
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security.6 1  However, nearly all of the U.S. programs of unilateral
economic sanctions during the 1990s failed. This failure lends credence
to the international belief that unilateral economic sanctions by the U.S.
are the result of "ill considered haste' 62 or "in response to immediate
events and domestic political pressure.'6 3 If these programs had been
based upon a multilateral decision, the international criticism for the
program would not have existed. Therefore, the international
community's response to the United States' use of unilateral sanctions
demonstrates the illegitimacy of unilateral economic sanctions.
As a general rule, multilateral economic sanctions are more
successful in achieving their stated policy goal than are unilateral
economic sanctions.64 For unilateral sanctions to be effective, the target
State must be vulnerable to the sending State. If there is not a high-level
of economic dependence between the two, the sanctions will be
ineffective. Obviously, an economically inconsequential sending State
will be ineffective if attempting to use unilateral economic sanctions. In
contrast, an economically powerful State may implement unilateral
economic sanctions and expect to have an impact on the target State.
However, the globalization of modern business has made it easier for
target States to find alternative suppliers, lessening the impact on the
target State. The success of economic sanctions is directly related to the
size of the economic power behind the program and the absence of
alternative markets. The general failure of unilateral economic sanctions
has been demonstrated by the experiences of the United States.
"[B]roadly based unilateral economic sanctions [used by the United
States] during the 1990s... have been almost entirely ineffective in
achieving their intended foreign policy objectives.'6 5 The failure of U.S.
61 Id. at 203-206.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Id. at 1.
64 See PREEG, supra note 10, at 215 ("The familiar statement that multilateral
sanctions are preferable to unilateral sanctions is self-evident."). See also
Yeutter, supra note 11, at 85 ("[U]nilateral sanctions are almost always a loser in
economic terms, and more often a loser than a winner in foreign policy terms.
The track record for multilateral sanctions (where we are joined by our major
allies) is better, but not that much better.").
65 PREEG, supra note 10, at 2-3. See, e.g., Id. at 207-208 ("[Tjhe overall
assessment is that unilateral economic sanctions during the 1990s, with few
exceptions, have been ineffective in achieving their foreign policy objectives
while having various adverse effects on other U.S. interests. The record for
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unilateral sanctions evidences the need for international coordination to
increase the likely success of economic sanctions.66 Such international
cooperation exists when a State enacts multilateral economic sanctions as
opposed to unilateral economic sanctions. Therefore, multilateral
economic sanctions are more likely to succeed than unilateral economic
sanctions.
VI. The United Nations: Legality and Justifying Circumstances
of Multilateral Economic Sanctions
The common use of multilateral economic sanctions by the UN
is a recent development. In fact, "[t]he first resort to mandatory
sanctions directed at human rights/democratization objectives is especially
bleak, while targeted sanctions for national security objectives, in one case at
least, produced a positive result. The rare exceptions of positive results from
unilateral sanctions, however, only tend to prove the rule."). See also Cheney,
supra note 11, at 22-23 ("[Tlhey [unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the
U.S.] almost never work."). Cf JOSEPH J. COLLINS & GABRIELLE D. BOWDIN,
THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, BEYOND
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCITONS, BETTER ALTERNATIVES FOR U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY x (1999) ("Nearly all unilateral sanctions fail nearly all of the time. The
frequent use of unilateral sanctions by the United States has generally worked
against U.S. foreign policy objectives. Although there is ample justification for
the selective use of sanctions, in a future strongly influenced by the
globalization of commerce and communications, unilateral sanctions will be
even less effective as U.S. goods and services become more easily replaceable
Vby those from other sources.").
Cf Daniel W. Drezner, The Complex Causation of Sanctions Outcomes, in
SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 212 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury
eds. 2000) ("Without a high degree of international cooperation, sanctions are
useless"). But compare HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 42 ("[T]here is
little correlation between the extent of international cooperation and the
contribution of sanctions to the policy outcome."), with William H. Kaempfer &
Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of
International Sanctions, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 162 (Steven
Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds. 2000) ("In order for trade or investment sanctions
to have a major economic impact on the target country, it is necessary that there
be a sufficiently large coalition of trading partners joining in the sanctioning
effort, comprising a large share of the total world market for goods and capital,
so that the target country is not easily able to circumvent the sanctions by
finding alternative buyers or sellers.").
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sanctions in the history of the United Nations was in December 1966." 67
In 1945, the "international climate" was "receptive to the ideas of
international cooperation.'"8 This "international climate" facilitated the
foundation of the United Nations. However, the onset of the Cold War
and its associated politics created a state of inertia in the United Nations
as a whole and particularly in the Security Council'69 This state of inertia
restricted the enforcement of international law by the UN, and
consequently, the use of multilateral economic sanctions. Regardless,
with the end of the Cold war, the UN found "itself at the forefront of
international relations, and the political deadlocks within the Security
Council have abated substantially. ''70 As a result, the UN recently began
to play a stronger role in the enforcement of international law than it did
during the Cold War.7' Since the beginning of the 1990s, the UN has
used economic sanctions to punish violations of international law under
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter.72  Therefore, the frequent use of
multilateral economic sanctions by the UN Security Council has been
occurring for slightly more than 10 years.
67 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, UN Sanctions and International Law: An Overview,
in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Vera Gowlland-
Debbas ed. 2001).68 ROBERT E. RIGGs & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 213 (1988) ("The Charter framers...never
contemplated that the United Nations would abolish differences of interest
among States. They did believe that international disputes should be kept within
peaceful bounds and that the United Nations could help with this task.").
See David Bills, NOTE: International Human Rights and Humanitarian
Intervention: The Ramifications of Reform of the United Nations' Security
Council, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 107, 110 (1996) ("In the Cold War era, the
Security Council consisted of a body of members with diametrically opposed
?olitical viewpoints that overshadowed all other international concerns.").0Se id. at 107.
71 See August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions,
95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 851 (2001) ("The end of the Cold War has led the United
Nations Security Council to intensify its use of economic sanctions.").
72 Cf. Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997)
("Article 41 [of the UN Charter] was applied sparingly for many years, but after
the end of the Cold War it was increasingly used.").
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At its inception, the primary purpose of the United Nations was
to maintain peace and security within the international community.3 The
primary means through which the UN was to achieve this goal was
communication. The UN was to provide a forum, "where representatives
of States [could] convene to discuss and negotiate issues involving
international political, social, and economic concerns. 74 It should be
noted that each member State did not surrender any sovereign rights by
joining the United Nations. The UN Charter itself was a multilateral
73 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United Nations at Fifty: The Security Council's
First Fifty Years, 89 A.J.I.L. 506 (1995) ("The goal was primarily to create an
organization that would serve as a mechanism for post-World War II
international security."). See also Robert W. Gregg, The Politics of
International Economic Cooperation and Development, in POLITICS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 106, 115 (Lawrence S. Finkelstein ed. 1988) ("In
1945, the UN's central goal was to maintain, "peace and security."); Id. at 109
(stating that the main goals of the UN are the maintenance of peace and security
and the promotion of equal rights and self-determination of peoples); John F.
Murphy, Force and Arms, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
97 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997) ("As Article 1, paragraph I and 2 of the UN
Charter suggest, the primary purposes of the United Nations are: '(1) To
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace'; and '(2) To develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace'."); Christopher C. Joyner, Conclusion: The
United Nations as Internal Law-Giver, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 457 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997) ("The main purposes
of the United Nations as set out in the Charter are to 'save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war'; develop friendly relations among States;
cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian
problems; and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'."
and that, "[tjhe fundamental 'purposes and principles' in the charter express
international concern over the need to suppress acts of aggression, to support
principles of international law, peaceful settlement, and international
cooperation."); RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 68, at 1 ("[Tlhe UN system
represents.. .human outreach toward peace and cooperation."); Id. at 3 ("[T]he
main reason for the UN is "prevention of war.").
74 Joyner, supra note 73, at 432.
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treaty and was binding under the principle of pacta sunt servanda 5
Therefore, member States had to agree to be bound by the UN Charter.
76
The United Nations itself was not intended to be a legislative body-7
Therefore, the UN was not in and of itself to become a ruling
government over all nations. The underlying principle was that States,
through discussion and compromise, could resolve their problems
without resorting to war. The United Nations was intended to provide a
forum for international cooperation to preserve peace, not to create a
one-world government that would create and enforce its own laws as
some individuals mistakenly contend.
When a major conflict occurs between member States of the
United Nations and communication and compromise fail to resolve the
conflict, the United Nations Security Council may endeavor to
collectively control the potential armed conflict rather than leave the
resolution of such conflict to the individual States currently involved. 8
To collectively control a potential armed conflict, the UN Security
Council was given the ability to enforce respect for international law
through the enactment of economic or military sanctions under the UN
Charter.79 Member States are considered to have consented to this
potential invasion of the sovereignty by becoming members of the UN.
Due to this consent, it is generally accepted that economic sanctions
7- See RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 68, at 22 ("Formally written and ratifies as a
multilateral treaty, the UN charter became a defacto constitution with the
establishment of the UN organization. ').
76 See id at 3 ("In the absence of supranational government, only voluntary
agreement can succeed in mitigating international conflicts, and international
organization provides an institutionalized means for eliciting such agreement").
7 See Schachter, supra note 72, at 3 ("Neither the United Nations nor any of its
specialized agencies was conceived as a legislative body.").
78 Cf Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 73 ("[S]anctions, whether military or economic,
can be taken only by the Security Council or by a regional organization,
?9ursuant to Security Council authorization.").
Cf Gregg, supra note 73, at 15. Id. at 15 ("[T]he Council has generally
applied Article 41 sanctions against a State that has not complied with a Charter
requirement or a significant legal obligation."). Cf Jochen A. Frowein, Opening
Remarks: Sanctions and Human Rights Law, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001) ("Sanctions
against the State for violations of international law, particularly for breach of the
fundamental norm prohibiting the use of force, are part of the collective security
system of the United Nations.").
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enacted under the authorization of the Security Council are justified
under international law.
Many third-world UN member States believe that economic
sanctions enacted under the authorization of the Security Council are not
justified under international law. This group of third-world member
States commonly argues that the power structure of the Security Council
is unrepresentative and unjust, i.e., that the founding members have
much more power than the majority of States. There is no doubt that the
present majority in the UN general assembly is third-world States.s°
There is also little debate over whether the third-world States are
incorrect. The UN Security Council does not accurately represent the
membership of the UN General Assembly. When enacting enforcement
measures the UN Security Council is intruding upon the sovereignty of
independent States and acting as if it were a government with police
powers over the member States. The third-world States claim that they
did not consent to this loss of sovereignty, and consequently, economic
sanctions enacted under authorization by the Security Council are not
justified under international law.
In response to the third-world majority, more developed States
argue that the UN was not designed to be a democratic organization.
Even though the UN is committed to a consensual process, 8 it was never
intended that the majority of member States would rule over the
minority. Although, UN political bodies, such as the General Assembly,
may, "act like legislatures by adopting law-making treaties and
declarations of law,'8 2 they do not actually have the power to create laws,
as does a legislature. The Security Council was not designed to be the
police force for the UN General Assembly. As a result, the UN Security
80 Cf Gregg, supra note 73, at Ill ("As new States from the Third World joined
the United Nations and ultimately became the overwhelming majority of the
membership the priorities that had characterized the organization's early years
were modified."). See also EVAN LUARD, THE UNITED NATION: How IT WORKS
AND WHAT IT DOES 159 (2"d ed. 1997) ("The West was converted, by the influx
of new members, into a minority, part of the larger minority of the developed.").
81 Cf RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 68, at 2-3 ("Democracy in national
government fostered the growth of international organization because both
involve, in essence, commitment to a consensual process. Just as democracy in
a national political setting implies a process of public decision making by
consent of the governed, international organization implies a process of
international action through the consent of States.").
82 Schachter, supra note 72, at 3.
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Council is not bound by the majority driven treatises and declarations of
the UN General Assembly. Instead, the Security Council is merely
obliged to operate within the confines of the UN Charter. The developed
States, which control the Security Council, argue that the UN Security
Council is operating within the bounds designated for it under the UN
Charter. Therefore, the proper authorization of economic sanctions by
the Security Council justifies the use of such sanctions under
international law.
In order for this Security Council authorization to be proper, the
Security Council must fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter. As a
condition predicate to the Security Council's use of enforcement
measures under the UN Charter, an international "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (hereafter "threat to the peace")
must exist. s3 The Security Council makes the determination that a
"threat to the peace" exists under article 39 of the UN Charter.
Consequently, third-world States argue that Security Council
enforcement measures are self-justifying and not a real restriction on
Security Council authorization. Nonetheless, once the Security Council
determines that a "threat to the peace" exists, the Security Council may
enact enforcement measures under article 41 of the UN Charter. The
Security Council has commonly exercised its enforcement powers, "to
impose economic embargoes extending to trade and financial relations on
either a comprehensive or selective basis."85  Presently, the Security
Council regularly authorizes multilateral economic sanctions to protect
the world community from "threats to the peace."
The conflict over the validity of Security Council authorization
of economic sanctions is representative of the deep divide in the modem
world between developed States and the less-developed world. This
83 See LUARD, supra note 80, at 23 ("Under Article 39, the Council is to
'determine the existence' of such a State of affairs and decide what
recommendations to make."). See also Schachter, supra note 72, at 15-16
("While the council may impose such sanctions only when it has decided that a
threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression has occurred, its
determination is considered discretionary and final.").
8 See Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of
the Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises, 73 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 551, 557 (1996) ("Chapter VII does not limit the discretion of the Security
council in making this determination [that a "threat to the peace", breach of the
peace, or act of aggression has occurred].").
85 Schachter, supra note 72, at 3.
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division plays itself out daily in the United Nations. As mentioned
above, the third-world States are the majority within the UN General
Assembly. This new majority is continually struggling to strengthen
their economic power. This continual struggle has caused a shift in the
focus of UN activities from peace and security to the "pursuit of
international economic and social cooperation.'4 6 In fact, "[e]conomic
development may be the UN's primary purpose today.' 7 When one
recognizes the power of this division in world politics, one is able to
understand the importance of the issue of economic sanctions and the
apparent injustice of the essentially non-democratic actions of the
Security Council.
The historical happenings that have created the present division
between richer and poorer States are of great importance. Through the
colonial period the West imposed its control on much of the modem day
underdeveloped world. However, decolonization and the abstention from
forcible control by the West in the latter half of the twentieth century
have left many relatively new States to search for their place in the
present world economy. Typically, these new States have not had
sufficient economies. Not surprisingly then, the first and foremost goal
of each new State is economic power. This is true because economic
power equates to freedom. A third-world State's struggle to develop its
economy is ultimately a struggle to increase its power for self
determination." Without a developed economy, the West is able to
continue to control the actions of the poorer States through different
forms of economic coercion. Though the West has stopped its physical
colonialism, economic imperialism still exists.
Economically weaker States have turned to the United Nations
for protection from economic sanctions as an outgrowth of treaty
protection.89  Several multilateral documents dealing with economic
coercion have been promulgated by the United Nations General
Assembly. Economically weaker States argued that article 2, paragraph 4
of the United Nations Charte9 created a rule against economic
861d. at 111.
17Id at 114.
88 Cf Gregg, supra note 73, at 114 (stating that, "it [the struggle for economic
freedom] is simply another stage in the long-term struggle for self-
determination").
89 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
90 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
VOL. I I
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
sanctions. This article is a prohibition on the "threat or use of force" in
international relations against "the territorial integrity or political
independence of a State." Of course, the meaning of the term "force" has
been controversial. 9' Economically weaker States argue that "force"
should include economic sanctions. To the contrary, many more
developed States claim that "force" merely referred to physical violence.
Currently, there is a general consensus that economic sanctions are not
prohibited under article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter
92
In addition, economically weaker States argue that article 2,
paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter and its principle of non-
intervention 93 create a rule against the use of economic sanctions.
Similar prohibitions on intervention into a State's sovereignty by
economic means are included in the U.N. Declaration on Intervention
4
the Declaration on Friendly Relations, and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.95 However, the subsequent behavior of
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations").
91 See generally BELATCHEw AsRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER THE UN
CHARTER: A STUDY OF ART. 2(4) (1991).
92 See Farer, supra note 1 at 410 ("[I]t must be concluded that Article 2(4) was
concerned with violence, with military force, not with economic coercion");
Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 67 ("Nowadays, one generally accepts that the notion
of "threat or use of force" in art. 2, Section 4 of the U.N. Charter is restricted to
"armed force" and does not include the notion of "economic coercion."). See
generally Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, The United Nations and Economic
Coercion, 18 Revue beige de droit international 9, 10-11 (1984-85).93 See Porotsky, supra note 23, at 920-921.
94 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res.
2131, 20th Sess., 1408 plen. mtg., Agenda Item 107, U.N. Doc.
A/'RES/213 I(XX)/Rev. 1. (1965) (stating that, "No state may use or encourage
the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce another
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind").
95 See Beirlaen, supra note 19, at 67 ("In the Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention in the domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty a State's "use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind" is condemned; in the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations it is stipulated (under the
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States has not recognized a rule against the use of economic sanctions.
In sum, economically weaker States have failed to create a rule of
international law against economic sanctions through the United
96Nations.
It appears that the third-world's struggle within the United
Nations for economic development has not succeeded in creating
protection from the economic powers of the western world. The voice of
the third-world has been heard in the UN General Assembly, and it cries
out for protection from the economic powers of the western world.
Unfortunately though, this voice has not been heard in the UN Security
Council. In fact, the United Nations Security Council is presently
increasing its use of multilateral economic sanctions. Therefore, the
United Nations has provided a forum for the third-world to request
freedom from the West's economic coercion and, at the same time, a
means, i.e., economic sanctions, that makes the third-world's request
appear meaningless. Nonetheless, the debate over the use of economic
sanctions by the United Nations is not likely to end in the near future.
heading "Principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter" that "no State
may use of encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of
the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any
kind"; the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources
"deplores acts of State which use force, armed aggression, economic coercion or
any other illegal or improper means in resolving disputes concerning the
exercise of the sovereign rights mentioned.. .above"; art. 32 of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States prohibits "the use of economic, political
or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.").
96 Cf SCHARFEN, supra note 7, at 86 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of the
UN.. .Charter or the UN General Assembly Resolution, the customary usage of
economic force since the drafting of these documents and the weight of political
and scholarly opinion validate the rights of the state to use the economic
instrument coercively for the good of a single nation or the world in general.").
But cf Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 31 at 12 ("We thus may safely assume,
that there exists a consensus declaring illicit the most extreme uses of economic
force. The problem remains, where this line is to be drawn.").
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VII. A Violation of Human Rights as a Justification for
Economic Sanctions by the United Nations
The United Nations Security Council has the power and the will
to use economic sanctions to punish violations of human rights norms 97
The enforcement of human rights by the UN is a very recent
development. The Cold War created a State of inertia in the Security
Council that restricted many forms of action including the enforcement
of human rights.98 Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security
Council has attempted to answer people who, "cry out for the
international community to bring an end to their sufferings caused by
political oppression, persecution, famine, or other disasters.' 9  At
present, the Security Council agrees that the enforcement and
preservation of human rights is its responsibility.100  Therefore, the
Security Council attempts to forward the cause of human rights by
authorizing economic sanctions to coerce changes in a violating State's
human rights policy. 101
To justify Security Council action in the area of human rights,
the Council has expanded the historical definition of "threat to the
peace." Historically, a "threat to the peace" was understood to be a
volatile situation or act of aggression by a State or group of States that
menaced the territorial integrity of another State or group of States. The
Security Council has broadened this definition to include "mass
97 Bills, supra note 69, at 114. ("[T]he Security Council has both the authority
and the will to enforce human rights."). Cf Fausey, supra note 22, at 193 ("The
imposition of collective sanctions is a tool used increasingly by the United
Nations in response to violations of international human rights law.").98 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
99 Richard B. Lillich, ARTICLE: The Role of the UN Security Council in
Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in
the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (1995).
1o Cf Bills, supra note 69, at 107 ("The end of the Cold War marked a turning
point in the world's political, social, and economic makeup. Efforts led by the
United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular resulted in a
new emphasis on democracy, humanitarian needs, and human rights."). See also
Id. at 129 ("Human rights initiatives have become an important part of the
Council's work in the post-Cold War era.").
101 See id. at 4 ("Even though the Charter does not specifically grant the council
the authority to initiate economic sanctions or military intervention to protect
human rights in crisis situations, such inherent power recently was validated by
Resolution 794, adopted in December 1992 in response to the Somali crisis.").
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violations of human rights."'' 0 2 The Council argues that a violation of
human rights will ultimately expand to affect the security of other States.
In addition, the global community needs a multi-national enforcement
mechanism to enforce human rights norms and the Security Council has
stepped in to fulfill this need. In fact, the condition precedent of a "threat
to the peace" may be vanishing from Security Council practice. In recent
practice, the Security Council has failed to explain how the violation of
human rights that justifies economic sanctions is a "threat to the
peace." 0 3 The broadened definition of a "threat to the peace" and its
subsequent diminution in importance have significantly expanded the
Security Council's power.
The UN Security Council's present power to authorize economic
sanctions based on a violation of human rights is extensive. When the
Security Council authorizes economic sanctions against a State based on
a human rights violation, its action is essentially a collective reprisal, 10 4
i.e., the Security Council attempts to enforce current internal human
rights law'0 5 with economic sanctions. Essentially, the Council has the
power to act as judge, jury, legislature, and police force when authorizing
economic sanctions based on a violation of human rights. 10 6 As judge
102 Schachter, supra note 72, at 21. See also Lillich, supra note 99, at 5 ("[T]he
Council.. .has found a State's violations of human rights to constitute a threat to
the peace and has consequently adopted mandatory sanctions against that
State."). See also Frowein, supra note 79, at 125 ("To a growing extent gross
and flagrant violations of human rights are no longer seen as only human rights
violations but also as a possible threat to the peace which can trigger the
application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.") Gowlland-Debbas,
supra note 67, at I ("The Council's determinations under Article 39 of the
charter that there exists a threat to the peace, or breach of the peace (though so
far not act of aggression), have served as the basis for the adoption of' sanctions
against many States and non-State entities.")
See Kirgis, supra note 73, at 514 ("When the Security council first imposed
limited economic sanctions on Haiti in June 1993, the discussion concerned the
urgent need to relieve the humanitarian crisis within the country and to foster a
return to democracy. There was scarcely any mention of a threat to international
peace and security.").104 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
105 Frowein, supra note 79, at 125 ("Human rights form part of international
law.").
06 Cf AI-Anbari, supra note 13, at 372 (stating, "It is true that Article 39 of the
Charter requires the Council to make a determination as to 'the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' before making its
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and jury, the Security Council determines which States to accuse, and
whether or not a violation of human rights has occurred. As legislature,
the Security Council determines how to define the human right that has
been violated. 7 As police force, the Security Council determines that
economic sanctions should be enacted against the violating State.
Because of its monopoly on the process, the Security Council's power to
punish a violation of human rights is extensive.
Perhaps the most incredible facet of this new Security Council
power is the Council's ability to interfere with domestic violations of
human rights. Under current international law, the UN Security Council
may authorize or require other world States to implement economic
sanctions in an attempt to coerce a target State's domestic human rights
policy. This ability offends traditional concepts of sovereignty.
Traditionally, similar violations have been considered within the
domestic jurisdiction of the violating State. However, States are no
longer able to hide behind the banner of domestic jurisdiction when it
violates the human rights of its own citizens.08 This diminished respect
recommendations or decisions as to 'what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42...' Such a determination is equivalent to a judgment
that an international crime has been committed, but the punishment to be
imposed is left totally to the discretion of the Council which in practice means
the five permanent members.").
107 Cf. supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
l0 See Fielding, supra note 84, at 555 ("[M]assive violations of human rights,
even though they take place internally with no or only indirect external effects,
can jeopardize international peace and security; hence, they may constitute a
threat to peace."). See also id. at 568 ("[Tlhe ability of the Security Council to
protect international peace and security, whether the threat has direct or
immediate trans-border effects or not, whether the threat involves the us of force
or not, or whether the threat arises from a newly recognized threat, is witness to
the flexibility of the language of the U.N. Charter. Perhaps the activism of the
Security Council, in recognizing new threats to peace, may lead to an emerging
right of all individuals to be secure and to have peace within the territorial
confines of their State, whether a threat arises across a border or internally.").
See also David P. Forsythe, The Politics of Efficacy: The United Nations and
Human Rights, in POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 247 (Lawrence S.
Finkelstein, ed. 1988) ("In the area of human rights the UN has moved from an
early deference to State consent to an increasing use of majority decision to
override State consent."); Fielding, supra note 84, at 554-555 ("It is now
increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind
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for domestic jurisdiction may or may not be seen as a welcomed
evolution to traditional concepts of sovereignty or as a license to
disregard and disrespect State independence. In either case, the Security
Council has determined that domestic human rights violations constitute
an international "threat to the peace" and subsequently, justify the
authorization of economic sanctions.
The ambiguous definition of human rights norms by the
international community allows the Security Council a great deal of
freedom to define such norms as it sees fit. Most States agree that the
"fundamental rights of the human person create obligations erga omnes
which must be respected by all States."'1 9 Not surprisingly though, there
is debate over what these obligations contain. On the foundation of a
few vague references to human rights in the UN Charter,"10 the UN
General Assembly has created a variety of "human rights treaties,
'al1
which have attempted to create a shared definition of human rights.
However, the General Assembly is not a legislative body 112 and many
States have not become parties to these human rights treaties or accepted
the definition of human rights contained therein. Therefore, when the
Security Council determines that a violation of human rights has
occurred, the Council itself defines the human right that has been
violated.
Security Council authorization to use economic sanctions based
on a human rights violation will inevitably be premised on a definition of
human rights that is not accepted by the offending State. For example,
the United States consistently denies that the death penalty violates
international human rights norms, while nearly the entire developed
world disagrees. The United States does not believe that the Security
which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with
impunity."); Id. at 555 ("The legal right of the international community to reach
within a State to protect a population from massive human rights violations is
supported by the concept of popular sovereignty."); Bills, supra note 69, at 113
("Recent Security Council action shows a trend not only in recognizing the
ability of the Council to become involved in situation over the claims of
sovereign rights, but also in the Council's willingness to do so as a means of
fulfilling its mandate to maintain international peace and security.").
109 Frowein, supra note 79, at 125.
"o Schachter, supra note 72, at 20 ("Its [human right's] beginnings were not
auspicious. The Charter references are slight.").
11 Forsythe, supra note 108, at 250.
12 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Council has the right to authorize economic sanctions against it based
upon the use of the death penalty because the United States has
determined that use of the death penalty does not violates human rights.
However, the Security Council could claim that the United States has
violated human rights norms and authorize the use of economic sanctions
against the United States. In such situations, the real conflict is over who
should determine (define) what human rights are and when they have
been violated. In other words, States disagree over whether such
determinations should be made by the domestic government or the
Security Council.
The extreme power that the Security Council has in the area of
human rights has led many UN member States to carefully consider
modem human rights law as the new imperialism 13 The West's control
of the Security Council and the world economy have combined to create
an extremely powerful way to coerce the cultures of third-world States.
The Security Council acts as judge, jury, legislature, and police force by
enforcing a view of the world through western eyes. Then the more
developed world States enforce the Security Council's decision to enact
economic sanctions. The third-world has few if any means to combat
this coercion. Ultimately, the third-world is left to choose between
adjusting their culture and economy to western ideas or suffering the
consequences of economic sanctions. At the same time, the most
important aspect of most third-world States' domestic goals is economic
development. It is difficult to argue that the Security Council is not
enforcing a new form of imperialism.
The extensive power of the Security Council to punish violations
of human rights obviously creates the possibility for abuse of such
power. " 4 As with most concentrations of power, whether or not the end
result of the Council's enforcement of human rights is just will depend
upon the people in power. It may be that the Security Council's desire to
enforce human rights norms is motivated by a sense of compassion for
the people of the world and a desire to do justice. Few States would
disagree with the general exigency for enforcing human rights norms.
People are suffering, and someone must help. The Security Council
13 Generally, the more developed States have the power to enforce their version
of human rights. Their version of human rights is commonly in conflict with
cultural beliefs held by less developed States. Therefore, the new imperialism
forces less developed States to adopt the beliefs of more developed States.
114 Kirgis, supra note 73, at 506 (There is a possibility of abuse of power by the
Security council.). See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
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argues that if it does not perform this function, no one will. If one
believes in modem human rights law, as enforced by the UN Security
Council, the use of economic sanctions to enforce human rights norms
may be the beginning of a new world order based on international justice
for the individual enforced through economic sanctions. However, it
may be that the Security Council's desire to enforce human rights norms
is motivated by a desire to create a homogeneous world built in the
image of, and for the benefit of, developed western States. In either case,
the exercise of Security Council power to enact economic sanctions
based on a violation of human rights is sure to be the subject of much
scrutiny over the coming years.
VIII. Expanding the Scope of Economic Sanctions to Affect
Third-Party States
Once a sending State has decided to enact economic sanctions
against a target State, it will strive to make the target State's economic
depravation as complete as possible. If the target State is able to locate
alternative trading partners, the economic depravation caused by the
sending State's economic sanctions will be negligible. In addition,
current trading relationships with the target State may negate the effect of
the sending State's economic sanctions. Therefore, sending States have
found means through which they expand the scope of economic
sanctions to restrict the availability of alternative trading partners of the
primary target State, including current trading partners of the primary
target State, within the scope of the given program of economic
sanctions.
A sending State may expand the scope of its economic sanctions
by involving third party States."5 A sending State may enact secondary
and tertiary economic sanctions against third-party States that are
economically involved with the target State. When a sending State uses
secondary economic sanctions, it sanctions firms or States that trade or
invest with the primary target State. 16 When a sending State uses
115 Third-party States are States other than the sending state, and the official
target State(s).
116 See DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 316 (1999) ("Another type of
economic pressure that has recently captured attention is the use of
extraterritorial, or secondary, sanctions. In these situations, the United States
threatens to sanction firms or countries that trade or invest in a country that it
has already sanctioned.").
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tertiary economic sanctions, it sanctions firms or States that trade with
the firms or States that are sanctioned under secondary economic
sanctions. For example, "the Arab boycott against Israel includes a
secondary boycott that forbids Arab states from trading with parties that
the Arab League Boycott Committee designates to have contributed to
Israel's economic and military strength. It also includes a tertiary
boycott that forbids the use of materials, equipment, or services of
blacklisted firms by Arab countries." 117 In sum, secondary and tertiary
economic sanctions may be used to expand the scope of traditional bi-
lateral economic sanctions to include third-party States that have
economic relationships with the primary target State.
The sending State's desired result from these secondary and
tertiary economic sanctions is two-fold. Primarily, these sanctions
should destroy current trading relationships other States have with the
primary target State. If the secondary or tertiary target State's economic
relationship with the sending State is more important to it than its
relationship with the primary target State, the secondary or tertiary target
State will, in theory, discontinue its relationship with the primary target
State. Additionally, secondary and tertiary sanctions are designed to
discourage any new States from filling the void created by such
sanctions. The use of secondary and tertiary economic sanctions
threatens all States with potential retribution for trading with the primary
target State. Therefore, secondary and tertiary sanctions are designed to
destroy current trading relationships between the primary target State and
third-party States, as well as to discourage other third-party states from
establishing new trading relationships with the primary target State.
Another technique that a sending State may employ to expand
the scope of its economic sanctions is to control the trading practices of
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations. An international
corporation will commonly have one State of nationality (or
incorporation), and multiple States of residence. The State of
incorporation may claim jurisdiction over the entire corporation under
the nationality principle.'" 8  For example, if corporation A is
headquartered in New York City, corporation A must comply with United
States sanctions regulations. If Corporation A has a subsidiary office
abroad, this foreign subsidiary will also be considered a U.S. corporation
117 SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 24.
118 The nationality principle holds that a sovereign State has the right to control
the conduct of its citizens.
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by the U.S. government. Therefore, the U.S. sanction regulations will
restrict the trading practices of the foreign subsidiary. Through this
technique of extraterritorial regulation, the United States has expanded
its program of economic sanctions into the territory of a third-party State.
In addition, the United States is regulating the conduct of foreign
nationals employed by the foreign subsidiary of corporation A. The
technique of extraterritorial regulation over foreign subsidiaries of
domestic corporations provides a means through which sending States
may expand the scope of their economic sanctions.
Most third-party States of residence, which house the
subsidiaries of a sending State's domestic corporation, do not approve of
the use of extraterritorial regulation by sending States.' 9  From the
perspective of such third-party States of residence, the sending State is
invading the third-party State of residence's sovereign right to control its
own economic policy and nationals. 20 The third-party State of residence
claims jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary corporation under the
territoriality principle 12' and over its employees under both the
territoriality and the nationality principles. International law does not
provide an answer to this conflict of concurrent jurisdiction between the
sending State or State of incorporation and the third-party State of
119 Cf Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary
Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 78 (1998) ("[I]t is
not uncommon for governments to resist the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. blacklists and controls. Such resistance aims not so much to espouse the
interests of the other countries' nationals and companies, although that is
certainly part of the motivations, as to preserve those countries' interests in
notions of state sovereignty and jurisdiction. This resistance manifests itself in a
variety of government-to-government communications ranging from private
diplomatic communications, to public statements or debate in both domestic and
international for a, to the passage of blocking legislation, and the pursuit of
international remedies where available.").
120 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 28 (quoting Raymond Vernon, "The
network of the multinational enterprise can become a conduit through which the
power of one sovereign state is projected into the territory of another"). See also
Snell, supra note 38, at 218 ("[E]xtraterritorial application of one's own
domestic law may interfere with others' ability to order their lives according to
the norms of their choice"). Cf DREZNER, supra note 116, at 317 ("The host
countries inevitable see extraterritorial sanctions as a violation of their
sovereignty.
121 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999) ("Jurisdiction over cases
arising in or involving persons residing within a defined territory.").
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residence. 22 Even though the current legal status of this action has not
been resolved, 23 sending States have effectively utilized the technique of
extraterritorial regulation over foreign entities to expand the scope of
their economic sanctions.
If the impacts of economic sanctions on third-party States are
derived from secondary or tertiary economic sanctions, the sending State
must be able to justify its use of economic sanctions under international
law. Primarily, sending States argue that third-party State's trade
relationships with the primary target State makes the third-party State
trading partner a type of co-conspirator. In essence, the sending State
argues that the third-party state is merely an extension of the target State.
Therefore, whatever justification the sending State claims for the initial
program of economic sanctions against the primary target State is
expanded to include all third-party States that have trade relations with
the primary target State. As a result, these sanctions will commonly be
reprisals that are justified by a prior violation of international law by the
primary target-state or by UN Security Council authorization. Third-
party States contest the validity of the extension of the target State's
responsibility for the prior violation of international law by the primary
target State. Third-party states commonly argue that the mere existence
of trade relations between a third-party State and the primary target State
does not justify international coercive actions, such as economic
sanctions. Regardless, the ultimate motivation for the sending State to
use secondary and tertiary economic sanctions is to expand the
effectiveness of its economic sanctions, and not to punish the third-party
122 Snell, supra note 38, at 304 ("Unfortunately, international law has yet to
develop mechanisms for resolving the conflicts arising under the present system
of concurrent jurisdictions. States are thus left relatively free to define the scope
of their own jurisdiction.").
123 See Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 100-101 ("The question remains whether
the link between the parent corporation, clearly subject to the territorial
jurisdiction of the state imposing the sanction, and the member of the
multinational enterprise established in another country, is sufficient to support
application of a prohibition by the sanctioning state to the foreign unit - branch
or subsidiary."). See also SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 27 (stating that the,
"conflict of concurrent jurisdiction over property, licensing rights, technical
know-how, and the actions of individuals and firms have created an unresolved
question of who has sovereign authority over these individuals, firms, and
resources."). See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and
Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1981).
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States for the actions of the primary target State. The sending States
conspiracy argument seems terribly weak. However, whether the
sending State's claimed justification for secondary and tertiary economic
sanctions is satisfactory under international law has not been
conclusively determined.
IX. Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions
Many factors influence whether economic sanctions achieve
their stated policy objective.124  In addition to basic economic
concerns, 25 the "personalities of national leaders,'A 26 "the kaleidoscope
of contemporaneous world events, ' '1 27 "the degree of competence in the
use of the [economic sanction] instrument, and the effectiveness of
political endeavors to terminate the conflict on favorable terms,4 2S all
influence the end result of economic sanctions. In fact, "[h]uman
personalities and plain luck may well determine the outcome of a
sanctions episode."' 29 The aforementioned factors combine to create a
complex system of causation that influences the success or failure of
economic sanctions.
The most difficult aspect of determining whether economic
sanctions are successful may be the ambiguity of the objective sought by
the sending State. David Cortright and George Lopez state that:
The calculation of effectiveness [of economic sanctions]
is a highly complex and nuanced process that must take
into account all the purposes that sanctions may serve,
stated and unstated, instrumental and symbolic. Such a
process does not lend itself to convenient quantification
or simple conclusions of success or failure.'
30
124 See SCHARFEN, supra note 7, at 180 (stating, "the utility of economic force
depends upon many related factors").
125 See DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE,
ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990s 18 (2000) (stating, "[t]he success of
sanctions also depends on a range of objective economic factors").
126 HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 4, at 79.
17 Id. at 79.
128 SCHARFEN, supra note 7, at 180.
129 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 79.
130 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 19.
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Policy makers may claim that a program of economic sanctions
is designed to achieve a specific objective. This specific objective is
most commonly a change in the target State's policies. If this is the
claimed objective, the cursory determination of whether the economic
sanctions are successful is simple. One must merely determine whether
the target State modified its policies.
It should be noted that the sending State's policy maker may
have other objectives that she does not state. In fact, the sending State's
policy maker may not expect to achieve the stated policy objective but
only an unstated objective. 3 In such a situation, the actual objectives of
economic sanctions may be instrumental or symbolic. For example, an
instrumental objective might be to use economic sanctions to impact the
target State's economy and nothing further. A symbolic objective would
be to use the economic sanctions to make a statement to varied
audiences. These audiences may include the policy maker's State, the
target State, and third-party States. However, making a determination as
to whether these unstated objectives have been reached is near
impossible. Only the policy makers know whether their unstated
objectives have been achieved. Due to this ambiguity of the actual
objective of economic sanctions, it is very difficult to have a
comprehensive analysis of the success of economic sanctions.
The relationship between the temporal aspect of sanctions and
their objectives adds to the complexity of determining whether economic
sanctions are successful. Economic "sanctions are applied over time, and
their immediate objectives may shift in emphasis over time. 132 Due to
the many varied factors that influence the outcome of economic
sanctions, policy makers are likely to modify the objectives that they
seek throughout the program of economic sanctions. Therefore,
analyzing whether economic sanctions are successful depends greatly on
what point in time one is analyzing the program and which objective of
the program is used for the analysis. It is possible that economic
sanctions achieve their initial goal and are not discontinued so that they
may achieve a secondary goal. It is also possible that the initial goal is
not achieved but that a latter goal is achieved. Determining which
objective must be achieved and the degree of success for each objective
is extremely complex. The fact that the objectives of economic sanctions
3 ' See id. at 18 ("[T]he major states that dominate sanctions policy may have
purposes in mind that differ from the officially stated objectives.").
32 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 629 (1990).
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are modified over time is a further aspect of the complex determination
of whether economic sanctions are successful.
Nearly all scholarly analyses conclude that economic sanctions
are generally unsuccessful. 3 3  In addition to analytical analysis, this
conclusion is supported by conventional wisdom. 34 It is clear that,
"tracking the effect of sanctions in any direct causal sense is not an easy
matter.' ', However, different scholars have attempted to answer the
question of whether sanctions are successful. To date, the most complete
scholarly analysis of the success of economic sanctions claims that
economic sanctions have the modest success rate of thirty-six percent.
36
The only real debate "among sanctions scholars 'relates to the degree to
which sanctions fail."",137 As a result, it is well settled that scholars have
determined that economic sanctions are generally unsuccessful.
Policy makers, not scholars, determine whether to use economic
sanctions, and in turn, whether sanctions are successful. 38 To begin an
analysis of a proposed program of economic sanctions, policy makers
must determine the specific objective(s) of the economic sanctions.' 39
133 See, e.g., THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
ALTERING U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY, FINAL REPORT OF THE CSIS PROJECT ON
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 11 (1999) ("The heart of the matter is to
assess whether the use of sanctions as currently pursued is effective in achieving
the desired foreign policy objectives. We have examined the record and
concluded that it is not"). See also Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 9, at 5
(stating, "instances of major policy changes under economic pressure are quite
rare"); Galtung, supra note 17, at 46 (stating, "the conclusion about the probable
effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally negative").
134 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 13 (stating, "[T]he conventional
belief, seemingly supported by the scholarly research, is that sanctions do not
work.") See also Abbott, supra note 17, at 783 n. 16.
"' MALLOY, supra note 132, at 629.
136 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 80 (stating that, "sanctions have
been "successful"-by our definition-in 36 percent of the cases overall"). See,
e.g., id. at 10 ("Sanctions often do not succeed in changing the behavior of
foreign countries.").
137 CoRTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 13.
138 Cf Kaempfer & Lowenber, supra note 66, at 159 (bringing to light the fiction
of a rational, individual policy maker, stating, "[p]ublic choice theory requires
for the most part that we reject single rational-actor models of international
relations in favor of an analysis of domestic interest-group pressures").
139 See Abbott, supra note 17, at 785 citing HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4
(stating that, such objectives commonly are: "(i) to effect change in a major
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When the objectives of the economic sanctions are defined, the policy
makers estimate the degree of influence the economic sanctions will have
upon the subsequent behavior of the target State. 40  To make this
estimate of success, policy makers might compare the proposed program
of economic sanctions to a similar program that has already occurred.
However, an accurate analysis of a similar, previous program of
economic sanctions may not be available. Furthermore, even if a
thorough analysis of the previous program is available, the ever-changing
factors that influence the outcome of economic sanctions may make the
comparison an inaccurate predictor. Nonetheless, policy makers must
still decide whether or not to use economic sanctions and whether or not
economic sanctions are successful.
At first glance, the increasing use of economic sanctions1 41 by
policy makers seems to demonstrate that policy makers believe economic
sanctions to be successful. 42  If policy makers do not believe that
economic sanctions are successful, why would they continue to use
them? Why would policy makers have exponentially increased their use
policy of the target State; (ii) to effect change in a modest policy of the target;
(iii) to destabilize the target State's government; (iv) to impair its military
potential; and (v) to disrupt a minor military adventure"). See also HUFBAUER &
SCHOTr, supra note 4, at 80 (stating, "the success rate importantly depends on
the type of goal sought"). See also MALLOY, supra note 132, at 628 n.3 ("The
critical policy question involves determining the objective (against which the
effectiveness of the instrument will then be measured).").
140 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 32 ("The 'success' of an
economic sanctions episode-as viewed from the perspective of the sender
country-has two parts: the extent to which the policy outcome sought by the
sender country was in fact achieved, and the contribution made by sanctions to a
positive outcome").
4 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 13 ("More than fifty new
episodes [of economic sanctions] have occurred during the 1990s"). See also
SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 202 ("Economic sanctions and incentives are
often maligned, misused, and misunderstood, yet they are increasingly the
policy tools of choice"). Cf SCHARFEN, supra note 7, at 136 ("[T]he question as
to whether or not economic force 'works' is nearly moot. Notwithstanding
ratios of success to failure, all indications are that economic force is being used
and will be used with greater frequency").
142 Cf. CORTR]GHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 13 (questioning if, "sanctions
work" and responding, "[g]iven the frequency with which sanctions have been
imposed in the last decade, policy makers seem to be answering in the
affirmative").
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of economic sanctions in the past few years? It is difficult to imagine
that policy makers are ignorant of the extensive studies on the success of
economic sanctions that consistently demonstrate that they fail to achieve
the stated modification of policy in the target State. As time passes,
"sanctions are a decreasingly useful policy instrument" due to the
"growth in global economic interdependence," which has "made it easier
for target countries to find alternate suppliers, markets, and financial
backers to replace goods embargoed or funds withheld by the sender
country." 143 Nonetheless, policy makers continue to increase their use of
economic sanctions. 44 Though the reasons may not be clear, policy
makers must find merit in the use of economic sanctions beyond the
mere likelihood of achieving the stated policy goal.*
45
The actions of the United States demonstrate this seemingly
incongruent situation where policy makers continue to use economic
sanctions in spite of their almost certain failure. In the 1990s, the U.S.
programs of unilateral economic sanctions "have been almost entirely
ineffective in achieving their intended foreign policy objectives.'1 46
During the same period, the growth of the international trading
community has made it easier for target States to locate alternative
suppliers and markets. 47 This has only increased the likely failure of
economic sanctions. However, the use of unilateral economic sanctions
by the United States continues to be extensive. Therefore, it is extremely
important to ask why the United States would continue to use economic
143 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 81. See also COLLINS & BOWDIN,
supra note 65, at 6 ("[The globalization of the international economy, the rapid
development of worldwide communications, and the spread of the Internet have
also tended to make both unilateral and multilateral sanctions increasingly
ineffective").
144 See Ted Galen Carpenter, Eagle in the China Shop: The Economic
Consequences of U.S. Global Meddling, in ECONOMIC CASUALTIES HOW U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 8 (Solveig
Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold eds. 2001) ("[T]hey [economic sanctions] are
often imposed even when there is virtually no prospect that they will achieve
their stated objective.").
145 Cf Kaempfer & Lowenber, supra note 66, at 159 ("Such pessimistic
conclusions [scholarly claims of failure] are somewhat puzzling in the light of
the fact that recent years have seen an increase rather than a decrease in the use
of sanctions").
146 See id. at 2-3, 200 (analyzing the U.S. unilateral economic sanctions enacted
against: Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Asia, and China).
147 See infra Part VIII.
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sanctions in the face of the apparent decreasing utility of economic
sanctions.
As was previously noted, often times the actual objectives of
economic sanctions are consistently unstated by policy makers. Because
the scholarly analyses of economic sanctions uses the stated policy
objective to measure success, the scholarly analysis on this matter does
not represent the view of policy makers. Perhaps economic sanctions are
primarily a political tool, 48 and any effects that they have upon the target
State are welcome, but unexpected. Economic sanctions may merely be
"symbols' '149 that policy makers use to communicate with their own
State, the target State and third-party States. 50 The main objective of
economic sanctions may simply be to satisfy the domestic political needs
of the policy maker who needs to appear to be doing something about a
given problem. 15' For example, when Britain imposed sanctions against
148 See HUFBAUER & SCHOT', supra note 4, at 2 ("[S]anctions also serve
important domestic political purposes in addition to whatever change they may
bring about in the behavior of foreign states.")
149 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 16 ("In addition to their official
or publicly declared objectives, sanctions can be imposed for symbolic
purposes."). See also Kaempfer & Lowenber, supra note 66, at 187-188 ("In
such approaches [to the signaling qualities of sanctions in collective security),
the automatic imposition of economic sanctions after some act of aggression is
intended to signal the community's disapproval and remind the offender that
unless amends are made, a war of all against one will ensure.").
I5o See Abbott, supra note 17, at 792 (stating, "economic sanctions may be
aimed as much at influencing third countries and setting the stage for future
transactions as at changing the policies of the immediate target State").
Compare Drezner, supra note 66, at 214 (stating, "sanctions are symbols; their
effectiveness is of secondary concern") with HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note
4, at 10 (stating, "the imposition of sanctions conveys a triple signal: to the
target country it says the sender does not condone your actions; to allies, it says
that words will be supported with deeds; to domestic audiences it says the
sender's government will act to safeguard the nation's vital interests").
151 See BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 65 ("Neither war nor economics can be
divorced from politics; each must be judged as an instrument serving the higher
goals of the polity."); Abbott, supra note 17, at 788 (stating, "economic
sanctions are frequently aimed at (i) multiple audiences, of which the immediate
target State may not even be the most important; and (ii) multiple goals, not just
the coercion of the immediate target State through economic pressure"). See
also HUFBAUER & SCHOT, supra note 4, at 9 ("[S]anctions often are imposed
because the cost of inaction-in lost confidence at home and abroad in the
ability or willingness of the US to act-is seen as greater than the cost of the
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Italy in response to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, "domestic political
considerations appear to have been of more concern to policymakers than
was the potential effectiveness of the technique of sanctions. ' 52 The
unstated objectives of economic sanctions are likely to communicate as
symbols and to satisfy the domestic political needs of policy makers. If
the achievement of these unstated objectives is used to determine the
success of economic sanctions, the likelihood of success would increase
greatly. In such studies, it might even be said that economic sanctions
are always successful. Merely using economic sanctions may satisfy the
domestic political needs of the policy maker as well as make them
symbols that communicate with other States. Perhaps this assured
political success is why policy makers continue to use economic
sanctions.
It is apparent that policy makers' decisions to use economic
sanctions are directly opposed to the scholarly studies that determine that
economic sanctions generally fail. In the words of Gary C. Hufbauer:
Lurking behind the conventional rationale [for economic
sanctions] are pragmatic reasons that too often come into
play: congressmen, governors, and mayors who sponsor
sanctions can reap all the political thrill of playing
"Secretary of State for a Day" without bearing any of the
responsibility. 
53
Hufbauer points to the unstated motivation for the use of economic
sanctions: political utility. Policy makers' decisions to use economic
sanctions are not based upon the potential success of economic sanctions
but instead upon the immediate political benefits of the action.
sanctions"). Compare Drezner, supra note 66, at 213 ("[S]anctions are often
imposed half heartedly by sender governments, out of a need to satiate domestic
political pressure to do something in response to some aspect of target
behavior") with CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 13 ("[S]anctions are
considered 'an ineffective bromide intended to placate public demands for
action but incapable of achieving real results").
152 MALLOY, supra note 132, at 626.
153 Gary C. Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions: America's Folly, in ECONOMIC
CASUALTIES: How U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND
LIBERTY 92 (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold eds. 2001).
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X. Costs of Economic Sanctions
Even though economic sanctions are generally unsuccessful in
achieving the stated foreign policy goal, they have instrumental effects
that impact the sending State, the target State, and third-party States.'
54
These instrumental effects are the direct and immediate costs of
economic sanctions as "instruments of foreign policy""' and may be
"political, military, or psychological as well as economic."'156 Individuals
and States must pay the costs imposed when the sending State enacts
economic sanctions.
The instrumental effects of economic sanctions on the sending
state are generally economic.' These effects include the modification
or destruction of private relationships, such as vested property rights
through blocking assets, and existing contractual obligations made
impossible by export and/or import controls." These costs are generally
borne by domestic corporations. 59 The present operating costs of each
154 Cf Kaempfer & Lowenber, supra note 66, at 159 ("[S]anctions are costly to
the sanctioning countries as well as to the targets").
155 See MALLOY, supra note 132, at 636 (stating that the instrumental effects of
sanctions are: "preventing the movement or transfer of assets already subject to
the sanctioning state's jurisdiction; limiting the flow of foreign exchange to the
target state; isolating the target country from international trade and financial
markets; and maintaining sanctions (and embargoes assets) as a counter or
"bargaining chip" for any future resolution of the differences between
sanctioning and target states").
156 BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 128.
157 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 165 ("[E]conomic costs result from a
variety of factors including the reciprocal nature of dependence and the threat of
retaliation; the negative repercussions of sanctions on the reliability and
competitiveness of domestic firms; and the incentives that sanctions create for
the indigenous foreign development of restricted resources."). See also Robert
Carswell, The Need for Planning and Coordination of Economic Sanctions, 19
N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 857 (1987) (stating that, "financial or trade sanctions
have often proved not only ineffective in achieving an ascertainable objective,
but have also proven to be very expensive, particularly to the U.S. business and
financial sectors that are affected"); HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 4, at 11
([U.S.] "business firms at home may experience severe losses when sanctions
interrupt trade and financial contacts. Moreover, they may lose their reputation
for reliability.").
158 See generally Georges Van Heck, The Effect of Economic Coercion on
Private Relationships, 18 Revue beige de droit international 113, 115 (1984-85).
159 Cf James B. Burnham, Export Controls: A National Emergency?, in
ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE,
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company are increased by the direct cost of compliance with sanction
regulations' 60  Each corporation within the sending State must ensure
that it complies with the sanction regulations. This means that every
affected sending State corporation must pay for individuals and
technology to ensure that it complies with the sanction regulations.
When economic sanctions are enacted, trading relationships between
sending State and target State corporations will be destroyed because
performance of any contracts between the two corporations is made
impossible by the sending State's sanction regulations. The use of
economic sanctions by the sending State may cause domestic business to
lose future business relationships. Domestic business will pay "the cost
of business never considered as well as the loss of potential foreign
investment."' 6' In addition, sending States "that frequently coerce can
create the reputation of being unreliable partners.' 62  Finally, when
economic sanctions are enacted, the sending State loses the opportunity
GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 34-35 (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold eds.
2001) (providing "a survey of ways in which an individual firm can be affected
by export controls: Direct cost of compliance: Staff, legal and consultant time;
recordkeeping costs. Indirect costs: Added time to respond to requests for
quotations; the increased uncertainty as to whether or not a specific item
requires a certain type of license. Deterrent costs: Potential business or job
applicants never considered or pursued, given an estimate of the added direct
cost, time, and uncertainties that would be involved. Competitive costs: Order
inquiries that are never made, ideas from foreign suppliers or consultants that
never get exposure; the ability of foreign suppliers or consultants that never get
exposure; the ability of foreign competitors to operate in an environment with
far fewer controls than the U.S. firm."). See Lash, supra note 12, at 13
("Current federal sanctions block U.S. firms from participating in nuclear power
projects, defense trade, and satellite launch programs. They prohibit financial
transactions and loans, restrict air travel and exports, impose embargoes, block
foreign firms from federal procurement, deny General System of Preferences
tariff treatment, and deny visas to corporate officers and their families.").
160 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
16 1 Lash, supra note 12, at 16. See also id. at 15 ("While the losses of initial
sales are quite large, the follow-up sales of goods, equipment, and services are
sales losses that will continue for decades.").
162 DREZNER, supra note 116, at 320. See Cheney, supra note 11, at 27 (stating
that it is difficult for Halliburton to, "function when our partners overseas are
periodically reminded that we may not be able to carry through on a particular
project because somebody here at home decides to sanctions the particular
country involved-thus causing us to be viewed as an unreliable partner.").
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to influence the target State through its economic involvement with the
target State's businesses. 63 These costs must be borne by sending State
businesses and their employees. Eventually, the sending State itself will
lose tax revenue because the income of its domestic businesses has
decreased. All of the above economic costs are borne throughout the
sending State's economy.
When the sending State enacts economic sanctions, it chooses to
bear the domestic economic costs of such action. Therefore, enacting
economic sanctions is a "deliberate infliction of economic self-harm
' 6
by the sending State. The sending State's willingness to bear this burden
may be based on the importance that the sending State places on the issue
at hand. However, it may simply be that the sending State policy maker
fails to recognize or consider the costs of her decision to enact economic
sanctions. If the former is true, it appears that the sending State should
not enact economic sanctions if domestic costs are greater than the
importance of the policy objective sought or the likelihood that such
objective will be achieved. In contrast, if the policy maker is ill
informed or does not consider the domestic costs to be of sufficient
163 See Cheney, supra note 11, at 27 ("[I]t is important for us to recognize as a
nation the enormous value of having American businesses engaged around the
world. To recognize that engagement does more to encourage democracy and
freedom, to open up societies, to create opportunities for millions of people who
up until now have not been able to participate, than just about anything else we
can do."). See also Robert A Sirico, Free Trade and Human Rights: The Moral
Case for Engagement, in ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: How U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 112 (Solveig Singleton & Daniel
T. Griswold eds. 2001) ("Ronald Reagan's words are worth recalling: 'The freer
the flow of world trade, the stronger the tides of human progress and peace
among nations."'); PREEG, supra note 10, at 223 ("maximum U.S. private sector
engagement can do substantial good by promoting democratization and
improved respect for human rights"). Id. at 9 (stating that, "[t]he loss of U.S.
private sector engagement in the target country as a positive force for political as
well as economic change" was one of the "six inherent downsides" of U.S.
economic sanctions). Cf Id. at 200 ("There is no rational explanation for the
contradiction between highly praising U.S. private sector engagement in
communist Vietnam and blindly condemning it in communist Cuba").
164 Valerie L. Schwebach, Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of
Resolve, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 188 (Steven Chan & A.
Cooper Drury eds. 2000) (also stating, "[a] state that levies sanctions is
deliberately sacrificing the benefits of an economic relationship for the sake of
its position on the disputed issue").
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concern, the domestic costs of economic sanctions may not affect the
sending State's policy maker's decision. In either case, the enactment of
economic sanctions by the sending State is a form of self-harm.
The experience of U.S. corporations provides examples of the
economic costs borne by sending State business.' 65  It has been
determined that, "[e]conomic sanctions [enacted by the United States (as
a sending State)] today cost the United States some $15 billion to $20
billion in lost exports, depriving American workers of some 200,000
well-paid jobs."'166 These "[e]conomic losses fall in several camps: lost
sales, lost market shares, lost technology, lost foreign investment, and
higher costs to American consumers and taxpayers." 6 William H. Lash
III has summarized the situation as follows:
Observe an economic tragedy in the making. You have spent
billions of dollars on establishing a first-rate corporation, employing
thousands of workers worldwide. Your product is an industry leader and
your technology is state of the art. In key emerging markets you have a
market share of approximately 85 percent. Then, voilA, overnight you
find that your government has placed two-thirds of the world's markets
under sanctions, restricting your ability to sell. This story is not by
horror meister Stephen King. The author of these repeated economic
horrors is the U.S. government.'
68
It is apparent that the use of economic sanctions has the potential
to decimate domestic business. The extensive use of economic sanctions
by the United States has created an international belief that U.S.
165 See generally William C. Lane, Caterpillar Inc.: A Case Study in America's
CAT-astrophic Sanctions Policy, in ECONOMIC CASUALIES: How U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY UNDERMINES TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 95 (Solveig Singleton &
Daniel T. Griswold eds. 2001) (explaining how Caterpillar Inc. has paid the
costs of economic sanctions).
'66 See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 153, at 92. Compare Lash, supra note 12, at
13 ("The estimated economic losses from unilateral trade sanctions are $15
billion to $20 billion in forgone exports annually.").
167 Lash, supra note 12, at 13.
168 Lash, supra note 12, at 13.
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businesses are unreliable trading partners. 69 This belief has cost the
United States international business opportunities. 70
It is logical to question why the United States would choose to
pay such high costs for enacting economic sanctions. One possibility is
that U.S. economic sanctions are motivated by national security interests
that outweigh the costs of such sanctions. Perhaps the mere political
utility171 of economic sanctions motivates U.S. policy makers to bear the
domestic costs of enacting economic sanctions. In such a case, "the
American people [would be] ...overtaxed and over-regulated so that
Washington can pursue the unrealistic goal of a permanent global pax
Americana.'' 172 The actual response to what motivates the United States
to enact economic sanctions is likely a mix of the above two
propositions.
In certain cases, economic sanctions are based on legitimate
national security interests or other highly important objectives, which
outweigh the costs to the sending State. In other cases, U.S. business is
forced to bear the costs of economic sanctions that do not have a
sufficiently important objective to outweigh the self-harm of enacting
economic sanctions. The U.S. experience demonstrates that policy
makers' decisions to enact economic sanctions should be carefully
analyzed due to the ambiguous motivation for the infliction of economic
self-harm.
The instrumental effects of economic sanctions upon the target
State are in part economic but also include the human costs of suffering
and death. "[S]evere economic sanctions are bound to impoverish the
majority of the population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural,
industrial, educational and health systems while spreading crime and
corruption."'173 Sending States ultimately believe that, "denying a nation
the benefits of trade will cause it to suffer, and that suffering will induce
169 See Lash, supra note 12, at 15 ("A fear of sanctions has led to many states
viewing U.S. manufacturers as unreliable sources of supply and the United
States as a nation that ignores the rights of private parties to freely contract.").
170 Cf Lash, supra note 12, at 15 ("Fear of U.S. unilateral sanctions also drives
American firms from lucrative joint venture or supply opportunities.").
171 See supra notes 143-153 and accompanying text.
172 Carpenter, supra note 144, at 9-10. See id. at 7 ("It is painful enough for
American businesses to accept the need to forgo commercial opportunities
because of bona fide national security requirements. It is far worse to endure
such interference when national security is not at stake.").
173 A-Anbari, supra note 13, at 376
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a willingness to bargain.' ' 74 As a result of this belief, sending States aim
to make the consequences suffered by the target State as dire as possible.
In fact, economic sanctions "may have contributed to more deaths during
the post-Cold War era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout
history.' 75 For example, "various agencies of the United Nations.. .have
estimated that they [economic sanctions against Iraq] have contributed to
hundreds of thousands of deaths.' ' 176 This massive human cost is a direct
result of economic sanctions.
The cost of economic sanctions to third-party States is an
infringement of their sovereignty. When economic sanctions are enacted,
the world economy is affected. The artificial (non-market) effects of
economic sanctions influence the domestic economic policy of third-
party States. This domestic policy control should fall within the control
of the third-party State's government. However, when economic
sanctions are enacted, the third-party State is coerced into changing its
domestic policy. If the economic sanctions involve the use of secondary
or tertiary sanctions or the use of extraterritorial regulation, the
infringement on the third party States will be greater.'77  Third-party
states commonly respond to these costs through diplomatic means and
enact blocking statutes178 to restrict the sanction's applicability within
their territory. The infringement of sovereignty that third-party States
suffer under economic sanctions is the denial of their right to self-
determination.' 79 These costs to sovereignty may not appear to be very
severe. However, the resentment built up towards the sending State may
become an important cost that the sending State will have to pay. For
'74 Schwebach, supra note 164, at 189.
175 Mueller & Mueller, supra note 16, at 51.
176 Mueller & Mueller, supra note 16, at 49. See also Reinisch, supra note 71, at
852 ("In some cases the maintenance of economic sanctions has resulted in
outright humanitarian disaster. That the sanctions against Iraq had such an effect
has been recognized not only by various health scientists, human rights activists,
and nongovernmental organizations, but even by some UN institutions.").
177 See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
178 Blocking statutes attempt to make it illegal for the third-party State's citizens
to comply with the sending State's economic sanctions.
179 See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 123, at 324 ("[F]oreign criticism is two
pronged: on a political and foreign policy level, the United States is seen as a
meddler, interfering in the internal political affairs of independent foreign states;
on an economic level, U.S. interference is viewed as a misguided effort,
undercutting policies of foreign states that are designed to promote internal
economic health and stability.").
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example, the British tea tax that in no small way triggered the American
Revolution did not impose a significant economic hardship. 8 0 Although,
"[i]t did inspire a revolution against the greatest power of the day.'481 All
of this demonstrates that the infringement upon a third-party State's
sovereignty caused by economic sanctions should not be taken lightly.
Before enacting economic sanctions, policy makers must
consider the costs of their action.18 2 Policy makers need to balance the
importance of their policy objective against the domestic costs of
enacting economic sanctions, the suffering of the target State's citizens,
and the infringement on the sovereignty of third-party states.8 3 If the
policy objective of the sending State is not sufficiently important to
outweigh all the other costs, a rational policy maker should not enact
economic sanctions. However, in reality, policy makers will most likely
value the costs to their own State over the costs to the target State or
third-party States.8 4 Policy makers generally believe that their State's
costs are relatively low, especially when compared with the potential
costs of military conflict. From the U.S. perspective, as articulated by
the current Vice President of the United States, Dick Cheney:
The problem [with economic sanctions] in part stems from the
view by my former colleagues on Capitol Hill that sanctions are the low-
cost option. They are the cheap, easy thing to do. It is not necessary to
appropriate any taxpayer's money. It is not necessary to send any young
180 See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 153, at 93 ("The British tea tax imposed no
real economic hardship.").
81 d. at 93.
182 Cf. Schwebach, supra note 164, at 188 (questioning, "whether sanctions are
sufficiently effective to justify their costs"). See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at
165 (1999) ("[C]osts must be balanced against the benefits derived from
economic statecraft before using it as a tool of foreign policy"). See also
BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 120 ("Costs always matter to the rational decision
maker, and cost estimates must be made no matter how difficult that may be");
HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 4, at 70, ("Policy makers need to take a close
look at the cost and effectiveness of sanctions when designing foreign policy
strategy.").
183 Cf SHAMBAUGH, supra note 5, at 177 ("Once policymakers have determined
whether sanctions or incentives are likely to achieve their chosen objectives,
they must weigh the benefits gained by achieving those goals using economic
statecraft against the economic and political costs of doing so.").
184 Cf Mueller & Mueller, supra note 16, at 49 ("The dominant powers have
shown that they can inflict enormous pain at remarkably little cost to themselves
or the global economy.").
Fall 2003
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
Americans into combat. We are able to take a firm, aggressive action
and do something about the outrageous behavior of the offending
government and, many members believe, it does not cost a thing.
85
There is no doubt that the costs to the sending State are serious
and deserve attention. Obviously, the policy makers' belief that
economic sanctions do not cost a thing is erroneous. From a moral
perspective, the costs to the target State and third-party States should be
seriously considered. A determination of whether the policy objective
justifies the suffering and death of citizens of the target State should
weigh heavily on the minds of the policy makers that inflict this damage.
Too often this damage does not even seem to be considered by sending
States. For example, "[i]t is interesting that this loss of human life [in
Iraq, due to the economic sanctions against Iraq,] has failed to make a
great impression in the United States.' 486 This disregard for the suffering
in the target State may also be motivated by the belief that economic
sanctions are a non-violent means of coercion. However, there is no
doubt that the costs to the sending State, the target State, and third-party
States are severe. Policy makers should seriously consider these costs
before enacting economic sanctions.
XI. Culpability and Punishment
Economic sanctions are commonly used as economic reprisals
which punish the violating State for its unwanted behavior. 87 The
United States has become "the world's policeman in the post-cold war
period" through its extensive use of economic sanctions. The U.S. has
been, "'assessing fines' in lots of places for lots of offenses."' 88 An
analogy may be made between economic sanctions and domestic
criminal punishment which is commonly enforced after a domestic
criminal proceeding. The decision to enact economic sanctions is
equivalent to an international criminal adjudication which determines
guilt for a certain international crime. Through a comparison between
commonly shared principles of domestic criminal law and the
185 Cheney, supra note 11, at 24 (emphasis added).
186 Mueller & Mueller, supra note 16, at 51.
187 See supra notes 67-114 and accompanying text. See also AI-Anbari, supra
note 13, at 374 ("[I]n practice sanctions have actually been used as a collective
punishment."); HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 38 ("Sanctions are
designed to penalize the target country for its unwanted behavior.").
188 Yeutter, supra note 11, at 85.
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international system of economic sanctions, the latter is shown to be
dysfunctional.
The determination of guilt on the international level is highly
suspect because the States involved in the conflict are the same States
that decide whether a violation has occurred. An impartial international
criminal court system, which would be capable of an impartial
determination of guilt, does not exist. Therefore, individual States may
determine that a violation of international law has occurred and enact
economic sanctions as a punishment. 8 9 In addition, the U.N. Security
Council is empowered to decide whether a State has violated
international law and authorize economic sanctions as a punishment.' 90
The sending State is not capable of justly deciding that the target State
has violated international law because it is commonly involved in the
conflict. Furthermore, the individual members of the U.N. Security
Council may be involved in the conflict. Even if they are not, the UN
Security Council decision-making process is highly suspect due to its
autonomy and inequitable power structure. 191  The international
determination that economic sanctions should be enacted does not
conform to common domestic principles of a fair trial because there is
not an impartial determination of guilt.
Assuming, arguendo, that a sending State or U.N. Security
Council decision is sufficient to justify the punishment of the target State
by the sending State, the manner in which economic sanctions are used
as punishment does not satisfy the basic requirement that only the
perpetrator be punished for the offense that was committed. The use of
economic sanctions against all the citizens of a target State is basedupon
the fiction that all citizens of a State are responsible for the actions of
their government. Under this fiction the culpable acts of the political or
military leaders of a State are imputed to the State's civilian
population.' 92 It is self-evident that all citizens of a State are not directly
responsible for the actions of their leaders. Nonetheless, the use of this
fiction has created an international system of collective responsibility. In
189 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing the unjust nature of
UN Security Council decisions).
192 See AI-Anbari, supra note 13, at 372 ("[Elconomic sanctions imposed on
states or governments degenerate to a collective punishment of the people.").
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other words, guilt is imputed through mere nationality' 93 It is obvious
that the use of this erroneous fiction punishes the innocent along with the
guilty and violates the elementary principle of domestic criminal law that
only offenders should be punished for their individual actions.
XI1. Conclusion
The use of economic sanctions involves the punishment of
innocent people.'94 Economic sanctions are designed to coerce the target
State into changing its policies in the following manner: (1) economic
sanctions devastate the target State's economy; (2) this devastation
causes the citizens of the target State to suffer; (3) this suffering causes
the citizens of the target State to modify the target State's policies, which
initially motivated the sending State to use economic sanctions.
95
Sending States assume that the suffering of the citizens of a target State
will translate into political change. Therefore, the damage inflicted by
economic sanctions is not specifically placed upon the leaders of the
target State, who are actually responsible for controlling the tarot State's
193 Cf. Galtung, supra note 17, at 46 ("Sanctions against collectivities will
always affect the just together with the unjust, since collective sanctions
correspond to a philosophy of collective guilt."). See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ,
supra note 125, at 23 ("[E]conomic sanctions are 'too often a blunt instrument'
and may impose hardships on a civilian population that are disproportionate to
likely political gains."). See also Fausey, supra note 22, at 216 ("The use of
collective sanctions by the U.N. to respond to violations of international human
rights law is intended to lead to further human rights violations. A large number
of people within the population of a nation are sentenced for the crimes of a few
of its members. This aspect of the concept of sanctioning is in direct conflict
with human rights principles outlined in the U.N. charter regarding living
standards. The foundation of collective sanctioning makes the U.N. appear
hypocritical at best when attempting to protect human rights.").
194 See Hufbauer, supra note 153, at 93 ("[E]conomic sanctions often wreak
havoc on innocent people.").
195 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 38 ("In theory, the target country
will weigh the costs imposed by the sanctions against the benefits derived from
its continuing policies-the higher the cost, the more likely that the target
country will alter its policies."). See also Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 9, at
4 ("[I]t is assumed that the economic costs would induce the victim nation's
decision makers, out of concern for the national welfare and their own
incumbency, to abandon the course that provoked the economic retribution").
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policies, but instead upon the State as a whole. 196 The general failure of
economic sanctions demonstrates that there is no guarantee that the
citizens of the target State will redirect their economic damage onto their
leaders.' 97 Therefore, when a sending State uses economic sanctions
they punish the innocent civilians of target States for the actions of their
leaders based on an erroneous assumption that the suffering of the
citizens will translate into political change.
When one examines the political structure of common target
States, the falseness of the sending State's belief that the civilian
population is able to modify the behavior of their leaders is made more
evident. Commonly target States are "developing countries whose
regimes are authoritarian." 198 These authoritarian regimes "do not
change their behavior as long as it is the vulnerable groups, rather than
the political or military elites, which suffer most under sanctions.' 99
The leaders and elites of these target States commonly have the ability to
redirect the damage from economic sanctions onto the poor minority
citizens of their State while they remain relatively unaffected. In fact,
these leaders may be able to use the economic sanctions to their benefit
and strengthen their power by creating a "rally around the flag" mentality
among their citizens.' °°
196 Cf PREEG, supra note 10, at 7 ("The adverse economic impact of sanctions is
likely to fall predominantly on the people in the targeted country, especially the
poorest, while an authoritarian government tends to become even more
repressive.").
197 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125, at 20 ("There is no assurance that
a sanctioned population will redirect the pain of external coercion onto political
leaders and force a change in policy, especially with the authoritarian or
dictatorial regime.").
198 A-Anbari, supra note 13, at 375.
'99 Id. at 375.
200 See, e.g., Reinisch, supra note 71, at 851 ("[E]conomic sanctions 'theory'
maintains that economic pressure on civilians will translate into pressure on the
government for change, but the targeted leaders, sometimes expressly intended
to be ousted by their outraged peoples, have managed to continue pursuing their
policies and to stay in power. Part of the reason for this effect derives from the
'leaders' ability to 'retranslate' the message of sanctions into punishment and
retribution against the country, which enhances popular support for the regime in
'rally round the flag' fashion."). See also CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 125,
at 23 ("Governments may use the adverse impacts of sanctions (1) to rally
public support and deflect their economic effects, (2) to further centralize
control of the economy and increase the repressive power of the ruling elite, or
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History demonstrates the truth of the above assertions. Fidel
Castro's power has not diminished due to the U.S. embargo against
Cuba. Despite the devastating Iraqi economic sanctions, Saddam
Hussein continues to rule. To base economic sanctions on the fiction that
citizens of an authoritarian target State are responsible for the actions of
their leaders, one must be blind to the reality of the situation. The
leaders of an authoritarian regime do not allow their citizens, who suffer
under economic sanctions, to influence their behavior. In such a
situation, punishing innocent civilians for the actions of their leaders is
wholly unjust.
Even in the case of a Western democratic society, it is self-
evident that mere nationality does not make each citizen responsible for
the actions of their leaders. 20 1 For example, it is clear that many U.S.
citizens did not claim responsibility for the actions of the U.S. military in
Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, under the theoretical
basis for how economic sanctions are supposed to work, other nations
could have enacted economic sanctions against the United States. These
sanctions would have punished all citizens including those that did not
support the War. Few U.S. citizens would claim to be directly
responsible for all the policies and actions of their government. Even if
these citizens did claim responsibility for their government's actions,
none of them could directly or immediately modify the actions of the
U.S. government. Therefore, it should be exceedingly obvious that the
imputation of responsibility to the citizens of an authoritarian State for
the actions of their leaders is completely unjust.
Considering the injustice, the general failure and the high costs
of economic sanctions it is logical to question why policy makers
continue to increase their use of economic sanctions. The likely answer
to this question is that economic sanctions have a high political utility.
(3) to dole out resources in a 'political' manner to reward supporters and punish
real or potential adversaries."); PREEG, supra note 10, at 9 ("Sanctions are used
as propaganda by target country governments to blame internal economic
problems on the sanctions and to appeal to anti-American nationalism.").
2 But cf Kaempfer & Lowenber, supra note 66, at 185 ("[P]ublic choice theory
directs attention away from sovereign nation states as agents of international
relations and toward individuals and groups within these states. Policy is
viewed as a product of collective choices involving voters, interest groups,
politicians and bureaucrats. The unit of analysis is not the personified nations
state, but rather those decision makers whose rational choices generate public
policies as endogenous outcomes of a political market process.").
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Economic sanctions allow political leaders to appear to be doing
something about a given problem. Whether the problem will actually be
resolved may not even be of primary concern. The primary concern for
the policy maker is to appease her constituents. Economic sanctions
provide a perfect means for doing this because most individuals do not
understand the dismal success rate of economic sanctions, the costs that
they themselves will pay as citizens, or the extreme damage that will be
inflicted upon the target State. To the citizens of most sending States, the
desire to implement economic sanctions is based upon a belief that doing
so will further justice in the international community. These citizens
want to improve the behavior of other States. When something happens
that the citizens of the sending State view as horrible, they pressure their
policy makers to do something about the problem. Policy makers will
commonly respond to this situation by enacting economic sanctions.
Policy makers will continue to use economic sanctions as long as the use
of economic sanctions furthers their political ambitions.
The political motivation for the use of economic sanctions might
diminish if the citizens and policy makers of sending States recognized
the costs that they pay when they enact economic sanctions. These
citizens and policy makers believe that economic sanctions will not cost
them anything. They believe that to say, "I support trade sanctions on
country X," means that they disapprove of the behavior of country X and
such behavior is so horrible that they can no longer maintain trade
relations with country X. Robert A. Sirico provides a more realistic view
of economic sanctions from the U.S. perspective:
To say, "I support trade sanctions on country X," really
means, "I think that American consumers ought to be
punished by higher taxes for their desire to buy products
from country X. American producers ought to be forced
by their own government to invest someplace where they
are less likely to make money. The U.S. government,
not markets, ought to determine where and what people
buy and sell across borders with their own money.
Moreover, the people in country X ought to be denied
essential goods and services and the right to enjoy the
fruits of the international division of labor.'
02
202 Sirico, supra note 163, at 109.
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In a sending State, such as the United States, the citizens and
policy makers often have a highly self-important economic outlook on
the world. In the case of the United States, they may believe that the
U.S. economy is so large and powerful that they will not suffer any of the
consequences of breaking off trade with the target State. However, this is
not a realistic view.20 3 The very nature of sanction regulations requires
that the enactment of economic sanctions restrict the freedom of the
citizens of the sending State. It is the citizens of the sending State that
are no longer able to trade with the target State. It is also the citizens of
the sending State that will potentially be punished for violating the
sanctions regulations. 204 If the citizens and policy makers of sending
States understood the true impact of economic sanctions on their own
State, it is likely that they might not continue to support their
government's imposition of economic sanctions. In turn, fiom the
perspective of the sending State's policy maker, the political utility of
economic sanctions would decrease.
If the citizens and policy makers of sending States recognized
the suffering and death that the enactment of economic sanctions causes
in the target State, they might be less likely to enact economic sanctions.
Currently, it appears that sending State's citizens and policy makers
205disregard the damage that will occur in the target State. From the
203 See supra notes 157-172 and accompanying text. Cf Carswell, supra note
14, at 863 (stating in 1987 that, "the time has long since passed when we can
afford not to think about trade and economic issues, including sanctions, in the
context of our long-term national security goals. It is neither sound economic
policy nor politically beneficial for us to continue to reduce our international
economic leverage for short-term political goals.").
204 See CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE To ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
EMBARGOES 102.021 (William A. Hancock ed. 2000) (stating that the penalties
for willful violations of sanction programs include fines up to $500,000 for
entitities and fines up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years for
individuals). See also id. at 102.021 (stating that the maximum civil penalty, per
offense, enforced under the JEEPA is $11,000).
205 See Mueller & Mueller, supra note 16, at 48 ("[T]he dangers posed to human
well-being by comprehensive economic sanctions are clear, present, and
sometimes devastating, yet they have often been overlooked by scholars,
policymakers, and the media."). See also id. at 51 ("[T]he massive death toll
among Iraqi civilians has stirred little public protest, and hardly any notice.");
Id. at 52 ("Some of the inattention may derive from a lack of concern about
foreign lives."); Id. at 52 ("Some of the inattention may also be due to the fact
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citizen's perspective, this may be based on sheer ignorance or upon a
lack of empathy for foreign peoples. On the other hand, policy makers
likely recognize the suffering and death that will be incurred by the
citizens of the target State. However, these policy makers place more
importance on the objective of the economic sanctions or on the political
benefits of enacting economic sanctions. Policy makers will almost
certainly argue that the enactment of economic sanctions is based on the
importance of the objective sought. Nonetheless, the general failure of
economic sanctions to achieve their stated foreign policy goal diminishes
the validity of this argument. Therefore, it appears that policy makers
simply do not regard the suffering and death that will occur in the target
State to be more important than the political utility of the enactment of
sanctions.
To determine whether policy makers actually believe that the
importance of the stated policy objective outweighs the suffering and
death of the innocent citizens of the target State, we must examine these
extremely important objectives. When the stated policy objective is the
protection of national security it is easy to believe that policy makers
would believe that this objective outweighs nearly all costs. It should be
noted however, that in the United States, economic sanctions have been
used for many reasons that do not appear terribly important. For
example:
We [U.S. policy makers] have established or seriously
threatened trade sanctions against various foreign
countries for any of the following reasons: (1) they do
not share the U.S. understanding of the relationship
between the individual and the state; (2) their police
forces do not conduct themselves as we would like; (3)
they discriminate against religious minorities; (4) they
do not accord trade unions the rights that they enjoy in
the United States; (5) they make overseas investments in
places we do not like; (6) they catch fish in a manner of
which we disapprove; (7) they trade with the wrong
that, in contrast to deaths caused by terrorist bombs, those inflicted by sanctions
are dispersed rather than concentrated, and statistical rather than dramatic.").
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people or they trade with the right people but in the
wrong things.
206
It is difficult to believe that a rational policy maker would believe that
most of these objectives are important enough to outweigh the suffering
inflicted on the target State. Therefore, it continues to appear that policy
makers base the decision to use economic sanctions predominantly on
the political utility of such an action.
Perhaps the use of economic sanctions merely demonstrates that
there are no better alternative coercive means available to the policy
makers of sending States.20 7  It has been established that economic
sanctions do not appear to be a useful means for international coercion.
It is well settled that economic sanctions: (a) rarely achieve their stated
policy objective, (b) have high costs to the sending State, the target State
and third party States, and (c) are unjust because they punish the innocent
civilians of the target State for the actions of their leaders. Nonetheless,
the world is not an ideal place, and in certain instances the necessity far
international coercion exists. In such a situation policy makers must
determine which coercive means they will use to modify the policies of
the target State. Policy makers will likely debate whether to use military
force, economic sanctions, or some combination of the two.208 Within
such a debate, the argument for the use of economic sanctions rather than
206 R. Ian Butterfield, Export Controls, Trade Sanctions, and the Nuclear
Industry, in ECONOMIC CASUALTIES: How U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDERMINES
TRADE, GROWTH, AND LIBERTY 48 (Solveig Singleton & Daniel T. Griswold
eds. 2001). See also Id at 48 ("[T]he U.S. Congress now appears willing to
legislate trade sanctions when only minor U.S. interests are under threat, or even
when no U.S. interests are endangered whatsoever.").
207 See BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 123 ("No matter how much evidence and
argument are amassed to demonstrate the uselessness of economic statecraft,
little has been said that is relevant to policy making until one states or implies
the existence of more useful policy instruments."). See also Nincic &
Wallensteen, supra note 9, at 15 ("Whether one regards sanctions with
equanimity or misgivings will depend upon how one assesses the options. A
new form of coercion is only as attractive or unattractive as are its
alternatives.").
208 Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 103 ("Sanctions are a middle
ground.. .between resort to military force and 'business as usual'.. .sanctions are
often too late and too slow. But the alternatives-doing nothing and applying
force-may well be even more unattractive in a still dangerous world.").
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military force is actually an argument against military force.219 Policy
makers debate the relative costs and benefits of military action and
economic sanctions to determine which is preferable in the given
situation.10
Sending State policy makers have determined that military
conflict will have a higher human cost than economic sanctions. Citizens
of the sending State may die if it uses military force, while the sending
State's citizens will not die if economic sanctions are used. The potential
human cost that accompanies military action decreases the political
utility of military action. This diminished political utility is a strong
motivating factor for sending State policy makers to use economic
sanctions rather than military force. Even if sending State policy makers
acknowledge all the economic costs that their State will pay when they
enact economic sanctions, military action has a higher perceived human
cost than economic sanctions because the sending State's citizens may
die if military force is used.
It is likely, but not necessarily true, that military action will cost
the target State more than economic sanctions. Only a case-by-case
analysis of the proposed military action and the proposed economic
sanctions is able to provide an accurate prediction of whether military
action or economic sanctions will be more costly for the target State. It
appears obvious that military action is more likely to have a higher cost
because it necessarily involves the killing of target State citizens. This
appearance may be erroneous because the long-term use of economic
sanctions has been shown to cause widespread suffering and death. It is
possible that the long-term effects of economic sanctions will cause more
suffering and death in the target State than military conflict. In such a
case, the sending State policy makers should consider the use of military
force as preferable to the use of economic sanctions.
Sending State policy makers might consider the use of military
force more just than the use of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions
punish the innocent civilians of the target State for the actions of their
leaders. Through a combination of modem intelligence gathering and
modem military weaponry, the sending State may restrict the effects of
209 See BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 129 ("One of the biggest advantages of using
economic instead of military statecraft derives from avoiding the costs
associated with military statecraft.").
210 See BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 121 ("The rational statesman will compare
the costs and benefits of a policy alternative with the costs and benefits of other
alternatives.").
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its military actions to those individuals who are responsible for the
offensive behavior that has motivated the sending State to act. The
targets of military action will be combatants: the leaders and military of
the target State. These combatants are individually responsible for the
actions of their State. The sending State's coercive action directed at
these individuals is relatively just when compared to economic sanctions.
If economic sanctions only affected the offending individuals within the
target State, economic sanctions could be as just as controlled military
force. However, the current use of economic sanctions is equivalent to
blanket bombing which kills the innocent along with the guilty.
The above analysis may provide more insight into why economic
sanctions fail. Perhaps economic sanctions fail because there is no
guarantee that the innocent citizens of the target State will translate their
economic pain into political change. Moreover, if the target State is
authoritarian, its citizens will not have the power to change the policies
of their government. In sum, the use of military force may be more just
than the use of economic sanctions because military force attempts to
restrict its effects to combatants, while using economic sanctions
knowingly punishes the innocent civilians of the target State for the
actions of their leaders.
The general failure of economic sanctions should motivate the
acting State's policy makers to use military force to coerce a change in
the target State's policies. It would be logical for sending State policy
makers to use the means of international coercion that will most likely
achieve their stated policy goal. The current use of economic sanctions
seems to go against this common sense principle of utility. Sending
States continue to increase their use of economic sanctions in the face of
an extremely low likelihood of success. From a utilitarian perspective it
is obvious that a pointed military action that kills the leaders of the target
State is not infinitely more successful than plunging the entire target
State into economic ruin. The futility of the latter approach may be seen
in the experiences of Cuba and Iraq. In both cases, despite extreme
economic depravation, the leaders that the sending State unequivocally
condemned have remained in power while the civilian populations have
suffered. Therefore, it appears that the general failure of economic
sanctions should motivate the sending State to use military force.
Nonetheless, a more accurate statement may be that sending State policy
makers are not particularly concerned with the success of economic
sanctions.
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Sending State policy makers are concerned with the immense
political utility of economic sanctions. The political utility of economic
sanctions appears much greater than the political utility of military force.
It is obvious that sending State policy makers will value their own costs
and benefits over those of the target State or third-party States.2 1" For
this reason it is apparent that sending State policy makers continue to use
economic sanctions because the sending State's use of economic
sanctions is less costly than its use military force. Also, the use of
economic sanctions provides the sending State policy makers with the
ability to appear to be doing something about a given problem. These
factors combine to give economic sanctions a high political utility. This
political utility motivates policy makers to use economic sanctions rather
than military force.
A Sending State policy makers' decision to use economic
sanctions disregards the economic costs that the sending State will have
to pay, the extensive human costs that the innocent citizens of the target
State will incur, and the almost certain proposition that economic
sanctions will fail to achieve their stated policy objective. It appears that,
at least in some cases, the sending State policy makers have been
motivated by self-interest when deciding to implement economic
sanctions. Sending State policy makers use economic sanctions because
it helps their careers and appeases their constituents, not because the
stated policy objective is of such value that it outweighs all the negative
consequences of their use of economic sanctions. At the least, the
present extensive use of economic sanctions should be restricted to
worthy objectives that might justify the extensive damage that is caused
by the use of such sanctions. Even if the stated policy objective is of
such extreme importance that it outweighs the damage caused, it is
highly unlikely that economic sanctions will achieve their stated policy
objective. This futility should weigh heavily against the use of economic
sanctions. If it is truly important to achieve their objective, sending State
policy makers should use the coercive means with the highest success
rate. As a result, even though it is counterintuitive, one must recognize
21 Cf BALDWIN, supra note 17, at 121. ("For the rational statesman the relevant
cost comparison is not between his country and the target but rather between his
costs and his benefits").
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that military action may be preferable to the use of economic sanctions.
Military action may be more successful and more just than the use of
economic sanctions. In conclusion, economic sanctions do not provide
an effective or just means of international coercion.
